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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Immigration and Frictional Labor Markets
by
Shiyun Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Economics
University of California, Riverside, September 2019
Professor Jang-Ting Guo, Co-Chairperson
Professor Victor Ortego-Marti, Co-Chairperson
This dissertation consists of three essays which rationalize the effects of immigra-
tion on labor market outcomes. Chapter 2 provides an explanation of impact of immigra-
tion on labor market outcomes and crime. Chapter 3 discusses how immigration behavior
of workers affect the population of immigrants and labor market outcomes between devel-
oped and developing countries. Chapter 4 studies the impact of skilled immigrants on the
measure of overeducation in the United States.
The relationship between immigration and crime is one of the important issues
on immigration that people are concerned about. In chapter 2, I construct a model that
can explain the relationship between immigration and crime and tracks worker’s criminal
behavior. This model allows all workers to meet criminal opportunities and commit the
opportunity that they meet if its value is sufficiently high. This criminal behavior is deter-
mined by the value that workers have in the legal sector. The model predicts that crime
rate decreases by 0.156 per 1000 population with the increase in the population of immi-
grants in the 2000s. Particularly, the crime rate decreases by 0.226 with an increase in the
vii
population of skilled immigrants only but increases by 0.061 with an increase in unskilled
immigrants.
Chapter 3 studies the migration behavior of workers and the impact of immigration
polices on labor market outcomes. The migration behavior is highly related to labor market
conditions and the direction of flows can be inverted. Chapter 3 models the migration
behavior with two skilled bias frictional labor markets between two countries. The model
captures the double-direction flows of skilled workers between the United States and Mexico
and shows that unskilled immigrants flow only from Mexico to the United States. The model
also discusses the immigration policy effects on controlling the population of immigrants.
Chapter 4 focus on the impact of immigration on overeducation in the United
States. Since the 1990s, the population of immigrants, especially skilled foreign workers.
I apply the mismatch measure model from S¸ahin et al. (2014). With the CES production
function, when there are more skilled workers in the labor market, the marginal price of
skilled labor decreases and the skilled jobs become less valuable. This effect may push skilled
workers to search in the unskilled labor market and increase the measure of mismatch in
the United States.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Immigration is an important issue in host countries, like the United States. The
immigrant population increased from about 5 million in the 1970s to over 40 million in 2015
in the United States. The share of immigrants in the total population in the United States
has become significant over that time, increasing from 5% to 14% of the population. There
has been a lot of empirical research on the consequences of immigration but there is not a
consensus. The three essays in my dissertation address the effects of immigration on labor
market outcomes using a frictional labor market framework.
The second chapter studies the immigration effects on labor market outcomes and
the crime rate. Many empirical studies have recently examined the effects of immigration
on labor market outcomes and crimes (Basso and Peri (2015); Bianchi et al. (2012); Borjas
(2005); Butcher and Piehl (2007); Borjas (2003a), etc.) and the results appear to depend
on which countries and which immigrant groups are being studied. To the best of my
knowledge, I am the first one to study the frictional labor market outcomes through both
1
the crime and immigration channel. In theory people discuss effects on labor market out-
comes through crime channel or immigration channel (Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014);
Engelhardt et al. (2008); Engelhardt (2010); Dai et al. (2013)etc.). Previous research has
examined each of these channels separately, but not simultaneously.
I extend the Engelhardt-Rocheteau-Rupert (Engelhardt et al. (2008)) crime model
with skill heterogeneity and immigration to analyze the effects of immigration on labor
market outcomes and crime rate. With the calibration of United States data, the model
finds that an increase in immigrants can make the overall labor market better off, but raises
property crime rates. I also introduce a labor market policy to increase unemployment
benefits for immigrants. This policy amplifies the immigration effects on labor market and
crime rates.
Chapter 3 studies the immigration behavior of workers in developed and developing
countries. Existing literature assumes that the population of immigrants in developed
countries is exogenous or that all immigrants only come from developing countries. However,
the data shows that double-direction labor mobility exists between developed and developing
countries. A model is developed with endogenous migration behavior and shows that this
double-direction labor mobility exists in the skilled labor market. The labor in the unskilled
labor market only moves in a single direction and goes from the developing country to the
developed country. The model is calibrated with the labor market data in the US and
Mexico and used to predict effects of immigration policies. A subsidy to firms who hire
native workers in the US attracts more Mexicans to move to the US, since the US labor
markets become stronger. The tax to firms who hire Mexican workers decreases the labor
2
mobility between the US and Mexico, because the labor market tightness in the US goes
down. A tax to Mexicans who move to the US discourages Mexicans to move to US as the
migration cost goes up. Subsidies to US-born workers searching for work in Mexico attracts
US-born workers move to Mexico.
Chapter 4 discusses the effect of skilled immigration on overeducation in the United
States. Skilled workers are able to search in both the skilled or unskilled labor market. There
are two equilibria in this model. When the population of skilled workers are small, no
skilled workers search in the unskilled labor market. As a result, there is no overeducation.
When the number of workers with high education are too large and there are not enough
vacancies for them, they are indifferent between searching the skilled and unskilled labor
market, causing the overeducation.
When the population of skilled immigrants increases in the US, it affects the
overeducation in two channels. The first channel is the price channel. The more skilled
workers in the market, the lower price of skilled labor, causing skilled workers search in the
unskilled labor market, leading to an increase in the overeducation. The second channel
is the cost channel. Skilled immigrants ask for lower wages and encourage firms to post
more vacancies in the skilled labor market. Therefore, unemployed skilled workers can find
jobs quickly and are less likely to search in the unskilled labor market. In this case, the
overeducation decreases when there is an increase in skilled immigrants.
3
Chapter 2
Immigration and crime in frictional
labor markets
This paper studies the relationship between immigration and crime by applying
the Engelhardt et al. (2008) crime model. The relationship between immigration and crime
has been debated widely, but there is no theoretical explanation that can well define the
effects of immigration on crime. This model constructs two channels through which immi-
grants affect the crime rate in the host country: a composition (direct) channel and labor
market (indirect) channel. These two channels provide explanations of the ambiguity of
immigration effects on the crime rate. An extension of the model with skill bias and im-
perfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor has more sophisticated numerical
results based on the U.S. labor market and immigration. A more generous unemployment
insurance system for immigrants increases both the unemployment and crime rates. An
4
extended duration of incarceration and a deportation policy reduce crime rates but have no
significant impact on labor market outcomes.
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, immigrants have moved continuously to the United States (U.S.).
The most significant wave of immigrants was between 1990 to 2010, increasing the popula-
tion of immigrants from 19.8 million to 40 million. Research on the impact of this wave of
immigrants on crime rates is not conclusive. Alonso-Borrego et al. (2012) find that immi-
gration has a positive correlation with crime rates, whereas Wadsworth (2010) argues that
immigrants reduce crime rates. Bell et al. (2013) provide evidence that asylum waves in
the United Kingdom increased the property crime rate but that waves of immigrants from
A8 countries have opposite effects.1 Neither wave had any effect on rates of violent crimes.
Bianchi et al. (2012) and Spenkuch (2014) find that immigration is positively correlated
only with property crimes. However, this literature is not able to explain how immigrants
affect crime rates.
This paper studies the effects of immigration on crime rates theoretically. By using
the Pissarides labor search model and Engelhardt et al. (2008) criminal behavior model,
there are two channels through which immigrants affect crime rates. The first channel is
called the composition channel. An increase in immigrants directly affects the composition
of the labor force in the host country. The propensity to commit crimes for immigrants
and native workers are different: compared with native workers, unemployed immigrants
1The A8 countries are eight countries that joined the E.U. in 2004: Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
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have more difficulties when they search in the labor market, but employed immigrants have
a higher value of employment in the labor market. As a result, unemployed immigrants
are most likely to commit crimes while employed immigrants are the least likely to commit
crimes among all workers. When the share of immigrants goes up, employed immigrants
drive the crime rate down while unemployed immigrants increase the crime rate directly.
The second channel is called the labor market channel because this channel operates through
frictions in labor markets. Firms’ expected profits increase when more immigrants search
for work in labor markets. Such a compositional change in the labor force leads firms to
create more jobs, which benefits both native and immigrant workers in terms of employment
and wages. The incentive of committing a crime for unemployed workers — regardless of
immigration status — decreases because they can get hired faster in labor markets with
more vacancies. However, employed workers are more likely to commit crimes because the
value of employment in labor markets decreases. Thus, the overall effect of immigration on
the crime rate is analytically ambiguous.
The existing literature concludes that workers’ criminal behavior regarding prop-
erty crimes is highly related to labor market outcomes. Burdett et al. (2003) and Burdett
et al. (2004) document that low-wage workers commit more crimes than those with higher
wages, and a high unemployment rate leads to high crime rates. Engelhardt (2010) states
that workers with fewer unemployment benefits commit more crimes. Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to link immigration and criminal behavior via labor markets.
The main difference between immigrants and native workers are their unemploy-
ment utility. I assume immigrants earn less than native workers. It is reasonable to consider
6
that this wage gap comes from the low unemployment value of immigrants for two reasons.
First, immigrants have limited access to the social security system, so they cannot have the
same unemployment income and benefits as natives. Second, immigrants lack social net-
works and communication skills, and can have culture conflicts in the host country. Given
these difficulties, immigrants must search more intensively for work than do natives and, as
a result, enjoy less leisure when they are unemployed. A lower value of unemployment leads
to higher profits for firms, as in the baseline Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model.
Immigrants have a lower unemployment value than do natives, so unemployed immigrants
are more likely to commit crimes. Employed immigrants receive a higher surplus from
employment than do natives. Therefore, employed immigrants are pickier than employed
natives when they encounter criminal opportunities. Among all types of workers, employed
immigrants are the least likely to commit crimes, while unemployed immigrants are the
most likely to commit crimes. An increase in immigrants directly affects the composition
of the workforce. The increase in employed immigrants decreases the crime rate, but the
increase in unemployed immigrants drives up the crime rate directly.
The crime rate is also affected by the criminal behavior of workers. Criminal
behavior in this paper follows the model of Engelhardt et al. (2008). As immigration changes
the workers’ distribution directly, these changes also affect labor markets and criminal
behavior of workers via labor markets. Workers encounter criminal opportunities at random,
but they commit a crime only when the payoff is sufficiently high. An increase in immigrants
does not change the criminal behavior of workers explicitly, but it leads to the creation of
more jobs in the labor markets. Employed and unemployed workers respond differently to
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the job creation resulting from immigration. With more jobs in the markets, unemployed
workers prefer remaining unemployed instead of getting involved in criminal activity because
they can find jobs faster, which increases the value of unemployment. Employed workers,
however, commit more crimes because their jobs become less valuable. These opposite effects
of an increase in immigration on the criminal behavior of employed and unemployed workers
may explain the ambiguity of the effect of immigration on crime observed in empirical
studies.
This paper calibrates the model to the U.S. labor market data and crime report
data in the 1990s. The model predicts that, with the wave of immigrants in the 2000s, the
overall unemployment rate decreases by 0.3288 percentage points and the wage of skilled
native workers increases by 0.13%, the wage of unskilled native workers increases by 0.23%.
The overall crime rate decreases by 0.156 per 1,000 population, which means the nation-
wide total number of criminal offences decreases by by approximately 45,988. In particular,
with the wave of skilled immigrants only in the 2000s, the overall crime rate decreases by
0.226 per 1,000 and the overall unemployment rate decreases by 0.1137 percentage points.
With the wave of unskilled immigrants only, the overall unemployment rate will decrease
by 0.2248 percentage points but the overall crime rate increases by 0.061 per 1,000. For the
numerical exercise, I also extend the model with imperfect substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor. The crime rate decreases by 0.139 offenses per 1,000 with the increase in
immigrants. In particular, the crime rate decreases by 0.193 per 1,000 with an increase in
skilled immigrants but increases by 0.053 offenses per 1,000, respectively, with the increase
in unskilled immigrants.
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Finally, this paper studies several relevant public policies. First, I consider the
effect of giving immigrants access to a more generous unemployment insurance system,
so that they receive the same unemployment benefits as natives. This policy raises the
unemployment rate of natives by 0.89 percentage points and lowers the skilled native wage
by 0.31%, unskilled native wage by 0.65%, while increasing the overall crime rate by 0.235
offenses per 1,000. Second, an extended duration of incarceration and deportation policies
reduce the crime rate by increasing the opportunity cost of committing a crime. The longer
duration of incarceration affects the criminal behavior of both natives and immigrants. The
crime rate declines by 20.48 offenses per 1,000 when the average jail sentence is extended
from 16 months to 48 months. The difference with a change in deportation policy is that
deportation only affects immigrant criminals. With this policy, the crime rate drops by 1.61
offenses to 4.48 offenses per 1,000, depending on country of origin. Both incarceration and
deportation policy have little effect on labor market outcomes.
This paper is the first to study the effects of immigration on labor market outcomes
and crime jointly in a search and matching framework. I extend the Engelhardt et al. (2008)
criminal behavior model with skill bias and the population of immigrants. The most closely
related paper on immigration is Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014). Their paper studies a
model with two frictional labor markets with skill bias and imperfect substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor. The authors show that an increase in immigrants can raise
natives’ wages and reduce unemployment. Compared to their work, the main contribution
of this paper is discussing the effect of immigration on crime rates. Criminal behavior
of workers in this paper follows Engelhardt et al. (2008). As immigration changes the
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workers’ distribution directly, these changes also affect labor markets and criminal behavior
of workers via labor markets. As the paper shows, this novel mechanism is important for
understanding the effects of migration policy on the labor market and crime rates.
Other related literature is as follows. Dai et al. (2013) also look at the relationship
between immigration and crime. There are two main differences between their paper and
this paper. Firstly, they do not have search framework so there is no unemployment in
Dai et al. (2013). Secondly, they show that the overall effect of immigration on crimes is
ambiguous analytically but do not do a numerical exercise to show which effect dominates.
The numerical exercise in this paper shows the dominating channel given different group
of immigrants. Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013a) introduce unskilled immigrants only.
Immigrants only show up in the unskilled labor market in the host country and compete with
unskilled natives, while there are only native workers in the skilled labor market. Skilled
native workers benefit from unskilled immigrants in terms of wages and employment, while
the impact of unskilled immigrants on the unskilled labor market outcomes is ambiguous.
Chassamboulli and Peri (2015a) focus on the effects of illegal immigrants on labor market
outcomes with a two-country model. They endogenize the migration behavior of legal and
illegal immigrants from Mexico, i.e., Mexican immigrants can choose either to stay in Mexico
or to migrate to the U.S.. In their paper, the presence of illegal immigrants encourages firms
to create more jobs, so the unemployment rate in the U.S. decreases, and the wages of natives
increase. Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010) also study the impact of immigration in a search
and matching framework. Ortega (2000) constructs a two-country model in which workers
decide whether to either search for employment in their own country or migrate. He proves
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that the migration equilibria Pareto dominates the non-migration equilibrium. Liu (2010)
finds that illegal immigrants lower the job-finding rate in the labor market and force native
workers to accept lower wages.
In section 2, this paper describes frictional labor markets with skilled and unskilled
immigrants. The steady state equilibrium of the model is solved in section 3. In steady
state equilibrium, an increase in the number of immigrants affects the composition of the
labor force. The effects of immigration on labor market outcomes and crimes, respectively,
are discussed in section 4. In section 5, the model is calibrated to the U.S. labor market
data and crime report data in the 1990s. The simulation with an increase in the numbers
of immigrants and the comparison to the data are reported in section 6. Section 7 discusses
policy effects. Section 8 extends the model with skill bias and imperfect substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Model
In the model, time is continuous, with an infinite horizon. There is a large measure
of firms. Both firms and workers are risk neutral and discount their future value at a
constant rate r. The productivity of workers depends on their skills; there are two skill
levels of workers in this economy: high and low. Workers who have college degrees or above
are considered high-skill workers with productivity yH . Workers without college degrees
are defined as low-skill workers with productivity yL, where yL < yH .
2 Workers are either
native workers (N) who were born in the host country, or immigrant workers (I) who were
2In the baseline model, I assume that high-skill and low-skill workers are perfectly substituted. A model
with imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is showed in section 2.8.
11
born outside the host country, regardless of their skills.3 The measure of total native workers
is normalized to 1, the measure of skilled natives is denoted λ. The exogenous measure of
immigrants is denoted as Ii, given the skill level i, normalized to the native population.
There are two labor markets, high-skill and low-skill labor markets.4 Only unem-
ployed workers search in the labor market conditionally on their skills. Unemployment exists
because of search frictions in these labor markets. Immigrants search legally for jobs in the
host country, and firms that hire immigrants do not get fined or punished.5 Immigrants earn
less than native workers.6 This wage gap comes from the different unemployment utility
flows between immigrants and native workers. Because immigrants lack social security and
social networks and can have communication difficulties and other hardships, they receive
lower unemployment income and have to search for employment more intensively to com-
pete with native workers. Therefore, unemployed immigrants receive a lower flow of utility
3The superscript/subscript variable i represents the skill level of workers, high-skilled (H) and low-skilled
(L); s represents the labor market status, employed (E), unemployed (U), or in prison (P ); j represents the
immigration status, native (N) or immigrant (I).
4In some cases, skilled workers can work an unskilled job. I relax this segmented market assumption in
appendix A.4, by using a model with random search in a single labor market. I thank an anonymous referee
for this issue.
5All immigrants considered in this model are legal immigrants, including naturalized citizens and perma-
nent residents.
6Using CPS in the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s and standard Mincerias regression (for example, Ortego-
Marti (2016) and Ortego-Marti (2017)), immigrants earn less wage than native workers, even conditional on
observables. I run the following regression of log wage,
log wage = βIIimmigration + βXX + 
where Iimmigration is the dummy variable represents the immigration status of the sample. It equals one
if the sample is a native-born worker. The variable X is a vector of variables includes year, education,
age, and occupation of the sample. The coefficient of Iimmigration is 0.075 (standard error: 0.0008) when
vector X includes occupation. It means native workers earn native workers earn 7.5% more than immigrants
conditionally on education, age, and occupation. The coefficient of Iimmigration is 0.108 (standard error:
0.0008) when the vector X does not include occupation. It means that native workers earn 10.8% more than
immigrants without conditional on occupation. These two coefficients are statistically significant. The results
also consistent with empirical literature (Peri et al. (2015), Borjas (1987), etc.).The results of regression is
available upon request.
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than do natives, even some of immigrants are permanent residents or naturalized citizens.7
More specifically, when a worker is unemployed, she receives an exogenous flow of utility Bji ,
which depends on her immigration status and skill, j ∈ {N, I}, i ∈ {H,L} and BNi > BIi .
The variable Mi is the number of matches that are made in skilled-i market, following a
matching function of the number of vacancies Vi and the measure of unemployment Ui,
Mi ≡ m(Vi, Ui).
The matching function is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave with respect to each
of its arguments, and it displays a constant return to scale. The worker matches a firm
at a Poisson rate f(θi) ≡ Mi/Ui. The variable θi is defined as the market tightness in the
skilled-i labor market, which is a vacancy-unemployment ratio. When the worker matches
with a firm, she starts producing with productivity yi. Exogenous job separation shocks
arrive at a Poisson rate δi.
Every worker in the economy is both a potential victim and a potential criminal.
All workers encounter criminal opportunities at an exogenous Poisson rate µ. The rate µ
also equals to the fraction of workers who may commit crimes. The probability of meeting
a type-ij unemployed criminal is µU ji and the probability of meeting a type-ij employed
criminal is µEji . For all s ∈ {E,U}, let Es,i(g) denote the expected (endogenous) crime value
of type-ij criminals with labor force status s ∈ {E,U}. Criminal activities are considered a
7According to CPS in the 1990s, about 40% of foreign-born workers have been in the U.S. fewer than
10 years. Some naturalized immigrants or permanent residents may have the same unemployment utility as
natives, but on average, the unemployment utility of immigrants is still lower than natives. This assumption
is also adopted in Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013a) and Chassamboulli
and Peri (2015a).
13
wealth transfer from victims to criminals. Therefore, the worker’s expected loss from crime
is
τ = µ[
∑
i
∑
j
U ji EU (g) +
∑
i
∑
j
EjiEE(g)]. (2.1)
When the worker encounters a criminal opportunity, she can observe the value of this
criminal opportunity, g, i.e. how much she can get from this victim. This value is drawn
randomly from a known distribution F (g) with support [0, gmax). If the value g is high
enough, the worker commits this criminal opportunity. The criminal can be arrested by
the police with an exogenous probability pi. When the criminal is in jail, she receives a
constant flow of utility x. Assume that workers value their freedom, so that x < Bji − τ .8
Incarcerated workers are released from jail and return to the labor market at an exogenous
rate ρ, which is independent of the value of the crime.
Each firm has only one job in the market, either filled (F ) or vacant (V ). A firm
enters the labor market freely by posting a job vacancy and pays a constant recruitment
cost, ki > 0, given the market that it enters. According to the free entry condition, firms are
indifferent to post vacancies in the high-skilled or low-skilled labor market. A firm matches
an unemployed worker randomly at rate q(θi) ≡ Mi/Vi. The firm offers its employee an
employment contract. This employment contract requires the worker to pay a one-time
hiring fee φji when hired, and the firm pays a flow wage w
j
i to the worker during the
match. This employment contract {φji , wji } is determined by some bargaining solution.
Once production begins, the firm receives the productivity yi from the employee. The firm
8Assume that there is no criminal activity in jail. Workers value their freedom outside of jail, therefore,
no one wants to go to jail for avoiding criminal activities.
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loses its employee either when a separation shock arrives or when the employee commits a
crime and is arrested.
2.2.1 Bellman Equations
Let ΠV,i denote the value function of a vacancy and ΠF,i denote the value function
of a filled job. The firm expects the capital gain from the match, E(ΠF,i + φ)−ΠV,i, since
the firm knows only the distribution of unemployed workers in the market before matching
with a worker. Once the match is formed, the firm receives productivity yi from the worker
and pays her the wage wji , which is determined by the employment contract. The firm
suffers the capital loss ΠjF,i − ΠV,i either when the separation shock occurs or when the
employee commits a crime and gets caught. Firms have no explicit monetary loss from
criminal activities. Thus, the asset equations of firms are
rΠV,i = −ki + q(θi)[E(ΠF,i + φ)−ΠV,i] (2.2)
rΠjF,i = yi − wji − [δi + µpi(1− F (g¯jE,i))](ΠjF,i −ΠV,i), (2.3)
where E(ΠF,i + φ) =
∑
i
∑
j(U
j
i /Ui)(Π
j
F,i + φ
j
i ), for all i ∈ H,L and j ∈ {I,N}.
Denote the value of individual of type s-ij as V js,i. Each individual can be in one
of three states s: employed (E), unemployed (U) or in prison (P ). Everyone has a burden
τ that comes from the criminal activity. Employed workers earn wages wji from firms and
suffer a capital loss V jE,i−V jU,i when separation occurs. Unemployed workers receive a flow of
utility Bji . They find a job at a rate f(θi) = θiq(θi), which yields a capital gain V
j
E,i − V jU,i.
Upon finding a job, workers must pay the hiring fee φji determined by the employment
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contract. Both employed and unemployed workers encounter a criminal opportunity at a
rate µ and commit a crime if the criminal payoff Kjs,i(g) is strictly greater than the value
in the legal sector. The criminal payoff Kjs,i(g) is a function of the crime value g. Workers
in jail receive a flow utility x. They are released from jail and return to the labor market
as unemployed workers at a rate ρ, and obtain the capital gain V jU,i − V jP,i.9 The value
functions of workers satisfy the following Bellman equations
rV jE,i = w
j
i − τ − δi(V jE,i − V jU,i) + µ
∫ gm
0
max{KjE,i(g)− V jE,i, 0}dF (g). (2.4)
rV jU,i = B
j
i − τ + θiq(θi)(V jE,i − V jU,i − φji ) + µ
∫ gm
0
max{KjU,i(g)− V jU,i, 0}dF (g) (2.5)
rV jP,i = x− τ + ρ(V jU,i − V jP,i). (2.6)
The criminal decision of a worker depends on the value of the criminal opportunity. A
worker commits a crime if the criminal opportunity is of a sufficiently high value, i.e., the
payoff from the crime should be greater than is her current value of either employment or
unemployment. The criminal payoff is the net capital gain from the criminal activity. If
the worker commits a crime, she gets the crime value g from the victim. She keeps the
value in the legal sector V js,i if she does not get arrested. If the criminal gets arrested, which
happens with a probability pi, she becomes a prisoner and suffers an expected capital loss
pi(V jP,i − V js,i). The payoff of a crime is given as
Kjs,i(g) = g + V
j
s,i + pi(V
j
P,i − V js,i), (2.7)
9To simplify the analysis, I assume that criminals do not have a criminal record when they return to
the labor market. The model can be extended to allow for criminal records, but the main mechanism will
remain unchanged.
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for all i ∈ {H,L}, j ∈ {N, I} and s ∈ {E,U}. Since the worker commits a crime only
when the crime payoff is higher than is the value of the current state, the reservation crime
value determines her criminal behavior, i.e. whether to commit a crime. The endogenous
reservation value is given as
g¯js,i = pi(V
j
s,i − V jP,i) (2.8)
for all i ∈ {H,L} j ∈ {N, I} and s ∈ {E,U}. When the worker meets a victim with a value
g that is strictly greater than the reservation crime value g¯js,i, she commits a crime.
2.2.2 Employment contract
I assume that there is free entry of firms in the market for vacancies, which implies
that ΠV = 0. The total surplus of a match is defined by
Sji = V
j
E,i − V jU,i + ΠjF,i,
for type-ij workers. From Equations (2.3) to (2.5), the total surplus can be rewritten as
rSji = yi − τ − rV jU,i − δSji + µ
∫ gm
g¯jE,i
[g − piSji + pi(V jP,i − V jU,i)]dF (g).
Suppose that workers and firms decide the reservation crime value together. When workers
and firms match with each other, the value of the match is V jE,i + Π
j
F,i. When the employee
commits a crime and gets arrested, the value of a prisoner is V jP and the job becomes vacant
with value ΠV,i = 0. Firms do not have an explicit monetary loss from workers’ criminal
activities, but they lose their employee and suffer the capital loss from this additional
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separation. Hence, the expected capital loss of a match caused by a criminal behavior is
pi(V jE,i+Π
j
F,i−V jP,i). However, the opportunity cost of a match is higher than the opportunity
cost of employees. Employees do not consider the value of a filled job when they decide to
commit a crime. Therefore, they commit more crimes than firms expect and the surplus
cannot be maximized. The employment contract is determined by Nash Bargaining, with
the bargaining power of workers given by β ∈ [0, 1], i.e.
(wji , φ
j
i ) = argmax
wji ,φ
j
i
(V jE,i − V jU,i − φji )β(ΠjF,i + φji )1−β. (2.9)
Lemma 1 The optimal employment contract that solves equation (2.9) satisfies
wji = yi,
φji = (1− β)(V jE,i − V jU,i).
The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are in Appendix A.1. The intuition is as follows.
According to the optimal contract, the wage of workers equals their productivity, which
depends only on the workers’ skill. Since the firm pays the productivity as a wage to its
employee and has no profit from the match, the hiring fee is the only revenue of the firm.
The match surplus in this case becomes V jE−V jU . The worker and the firm share the surplus
based on the worker’s bargaining power β, so that the optimal hiring fee equals to the firm’s
share of the match surplus. Since the hiring fee covers the firm’s share of the surplus, the
firm is not concerned about the inefficient separation that is caused by the worker’s criminal
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activities. Firms transfer implicitly to workers their risk of losing employees, which is caused
by employees’ criminal behavior.
2.2.3 Discussion: optimal contract and Nash bargaining
According to Nash (1953), Nash efficiency requires convexity of the bargaining set.
Shimer (2006) shows the on-the-job search violates the convexity of bargaining set. Similar
to the on-the-job search, the criminal behavior in this model creates extra job separation
by employees. In this case, the bargaining set with criminal behavior violates the Nash
efficiency axiom.
Intuitively, risk-neutral firms and workers are only concerned about the match
surplus. They are willing to have an employment contract that can maximize the match
surplus. Similar to on-the-job search, the criminal behavior of employees generates ineffi-
cient job separations. The standard Nash bargaining share rule is not able to provide a
Pareto-efficient outcome, since it does not consider the asymmetric information of crimi-
nal behavior between workers and firms. This situation may shorten the duration of the
match, and, as a result, firms suffer an additional capital loss. Therefore, the model needs
a contract that can transfer this loss to employees. Similar to Stevens (2004) and to follow
Engelhardt et al. (2008) closely, I assume that firms offer their employees an employment
contract with a hiring fee and a constant wage. According to Stevens (2004), this employ-
ment contract is the first best contract for on-the-job search. Assume that workers and
employers can cooperate, they will deviate from the Nash bargaining to this employment
contract and achieve Pareto optimum.
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Appendix A.2 shows the version of the model with the standard Nash bargaining.
A further comparison is also provided in appendix A.2.
2.3 Equilibrium
From equation (2.2) and ΠV,i = 0, the job creation condition (JC) is
ki
q(θi)
= E(ΠF,i + φi). (2.10)
In equilibrium, the average cost of posting a vacancy equals the expected revenue
of firms. The left hand side of equation (2.10) represents the average cost of a match. The
job filling rate q(θi) is defined as the ratio of matches to vacancies, i.e., q(θi) ≡ Mi/Vi.
Hence,
ki/q(θi) = kiVi/Mi. (2.11)
The variable kiVi is the total cost of all vacancies in the labor market i, and Mi is the
number of matches, so equation (2.11) represents the average cost of matches. The right
hand side of equation (2.10) represents the expected revenue of a match. Given the zero
profit condition of vacant and filled jobs (ΠV,i = 0,Π
j
F,i = 0), the hiring fee is the only
source of firms’ revenue. Firms know only the distribution of unemployed workers before
matching with any unemployed workers. Therefore, the expected hiring fee is a weighted
average of hiring fees, i.e., φei =
∑
i
∑
j(U
j
i /U)φ
j
i . Using (2.4) and (2.5), the hiring fee of
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type-ij is
φji = (1− β)(V jE,i − V jU,i)
=
1− β
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
[
yi −Bji − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
(1− F (g))dg
]
. (2.12)
Given equation (2.10) and lemma 1, the job creation condition is rewritten as
ki
q(θi)
= φei
=
1− β
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
E
[
yi −Bi − µ
∫ g¯E,i
g¯U,i
(1− F (g))dg
]
. (2.13)
The measures of type-ij unemployed workers and total unemployed workers are
given by workers’ flows.
Figure 2.1: Worker flows
Figure 2.1 shows workers’ flows. There are three states of workers: employed,
unemployed, and in prison. At a steady state, the inflows of each pool are equal to its
outflows. Equation (2.14) shows that flows into and flows out of unemployment must be
equal. The flows out of unemployment are unemployed individuals who get hired, θiq(θi)U
j
i ,
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and individuals who commit a crime and get arrested, ηjU,iU
j
i . The variable η
j
s,i ≡ piµ(1 −
F (g¯js,i)) represents the probability that a worker commits a crime and gets caught. The
flows into unemployment correspond to employed individuals who lose their jobs δiE
j
i and
individuals who are released from jail ρP ji . Equation (2.15) represents the flows into and
out of employment. Similarly, the flows into employment include individuals that get hired
θq(θi)U
j
i . The flows out of employment are given by employees that suffer a job separation
shock δiE
j
i and by employed workers who commit crimes and get arrested η
j
E,iE
j
i . The
population of type-ij workers is the sum of employed workers, unemployed workers, and
prisoners.
δiE
j
i + ρP
j
i = [θiq(θi) + η
j
U,i]U
j
i , (2.14)
(δi + η
j
E,i)E
j
i = θiq(θi)U
j
i , (2.15)
λ = ENH + U
N
H + P
N
H , (2.16)
1− λ = ENL + UNL + PNL , (2.17)
IH = E
I
H + U
I
H + P
I
H , (2.18)
IL = E
I
L + U
I
L + P
I
L, (2.19)
Using the above flow equations, the steady state measure of unemployment of each
type of workers is as follows
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UNH =
ρ(δH + η
N
E,H)λ
θHq(θH)(ηNE,H + ρ) + (η
N
E,H + δH)(η
N
U,H + ρ)
, (2.20)
U IH =
ρ(δH + η
I
E,H)IH
θHq(θH)(ηIE,H + ρ) + (η
I
E,H + δH)(η
I
U,H + ρ)
, (2.21)
UNL =
ρ(δL + η
N
E,L)(1− λ)
θLq(θL)(ηNE,L + ρ) + (η
N
E,L + δL)(η
N
U,L + ρ)
, (2.22)
U IL =
ρ(δL + η
I
E,L)IL
θLq(θL)(ηIE,L + ρ) + (η
I
E,L + δL)(η
I
U,L + ρ)
. (2.23)
Before solving for the equilibrium, the formal definition of the steady state equi-
librium is the following.
Definition 1 The steady state equilibrium is a set of variables, {θi, g¯jE,i, g¯jU,i, U ji , Eji , P ji , τ}
for all i ∈ {H,L}, j ∈ {N, I}, such that: θi satisfies equation (2.13); {U ji , Eji , P ji } satisfy
equations (2.14) – (2.19); {g¯jE,i, g¯jU,i} satisfy equation (2.8); and τ satisfies equation (2.1).
The equilibrium is recursively solvable. Equations (2.14) to (2.19) determine the distribution
of workers given any θi. The pair of reservation crime values of employed and unemployed
workers {g¯jE,i, g¯jU,i} are solved jointly by equations (2.4) to (2.6) and (2.8). The expected
revenue of a match is determined by equations (2.4) and (2.5). Finally, θi satisfies (2.13).
Figure 2.2 represents the equilibrium.10 The equilibrium market tightness is de-
termined by the equality of average recruitment cost, represented by the curve AC, and
the expected hiring fee, represented by the curve HF; i.e., the equilibrium is the intersec-
tion of the AC and HF curves. With a higher market tightness, the firm needs to wait
10The concavity of the curves does not affect the determination of the equilibrium. The AC and HF curves
are drawn as straight lines for simplification.
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longer to hire a worker, so the average recruitment cost increases. Hence, the AC curve
is upward-sloping. The slope of the curve HF depends on the workers’ distribution and
the match surplus. Unemployed workers get hired sooner when market tightness increases.
It increases the value of unemployed workers and shrinks the difference between employed
and unemployed workers. As a result, the match surplus decreases with market tightness.
However, the effect on the workers’ distribution is ambiguous. Given (2.20) and (2.21), the
unemployment distribution depends on market tightness. When market tightness increases,
the measure of unemployment of each type of workers decreases and so does the measure
of total unemployment. Under a set of reasonable parameter values, the fraction of each
type of unemployed worker U ji /Ui barely changes. Therefore, the effect of market tightness
on the match surplus dominates. The hiring fee is in constant proportion to the match
surplus, so it also decreases with the market tightness as well. The slope of the curve HF
is downward-sloping.
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium
Lemma 2 The expected hiring fee φei decreases with θi.
When θi goes to zero, there are too many unemployed workers and no vacancies in the labor
market. The firm matches with a worker as soon as it posts a vacancy. Hence, the average
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recruitment cost goes to zero. When θi = 0, the expected hiring fee is
φei = (1− β)E
[
yi −Bi − µ
∫ g¯E,i
g¯U,i
(1− F (g))dg
r + δi
]
.
If φei > 0 at θi = 0, the curve AC and the curve HF have an unique intersection on (θi, φ
e
i )
space and θi > 0 at the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium with θi > 0 exists and is unique if φ
e
i > 0 when θi = 0. In
equilibrium, g¯jE,i > g¯
j
U,i.
Proposition 1 also states that unemployed workers are more likely to commit a
crime than are employed workers in equilibrium. If φei > 0, then V
j
E,i > V
j
U,i. Employed
workers have a higher value than when they are unemployed. As a consequence, employed
workers have a higher reservation crime value and are pickier than unemployed workers
when encountering criminal opportunities.
2.4 Effects of Immigration
This section discusses the effects of an increase in the number of immigrants on
labor market outcomes and crime rates.
2.4.1 Composition (direct) effects
When the population of immigrants increases, the share of immigrants in the total
labor force distribution increases directly. To see how this increase in immigrant popula-
tion affect the overall crime rate, I compare the reservation value of committing crimes of
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immigrants with native workers. Employed immigrants, conditional on their skills, are less
likely to commit crimes than employed native workers. Meanwhile, unemployed immigrants
have more incentives to commit crimes compared with unemployed native workers, because
of their lower unemployment utility.
Lemma 3 For all i ∈ {H,L}, the reservation value of crime of immigrants with skill i,
g¯Is,i,
i) g¯IE,i > g¯
N
E,i if δi < ρ;
ii) g¯IU,i < g¯
N
U,i.
The reservation value of crime is also related to the skill level. Skilled workers are
less likely to commit crimes, regardless of their labor market and immigration status.
Lemma 4 For all s ∈ {E,U} and j ∈ {N, I}, the reservation value of crime for skilled
workers is higher than unskilled workers, i.e. g¯js,H > g¯
j
s,L.
The crime rate is defined as
c =
∑
i
∑
j [(1− F (g¯jE,i))Eji + (1− F (g¯jU,i))U ji ]∑
i
∑
j(E
j
i + U
j
i )
, (2.24)
which is the weighted average of crime rates of each type of worker. Employed and unem-
ployed immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than all unskilled workers, regardless of
unskilled native or immigrant workers. When the population of skilled immigrants increase,
the crime rate drops directly. However, when the population of unskilled immigrants in-
creases, the share of unskilled workers goes up and the share of skilled workers decreases—
this composition change directly increases the overall crime rate.
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Proposition 2 Given a certain market tightness, an increase in the population of skilled
immigrants, IH , decreases the overall crime rate.
Proposition 3 Given a certain market tightness, an increase in the population of unskilled
immigrants, IL, increases the overall crime rate.
2.4.2 Labor market (indirect) effects
In either the skilled or unskilled labor market, immigrants pay a higher hiring fee
than native workers.
Lemma 5 The rank of hiring fee of each type of workers is: φIi > φ
N
i for all i ∈ {H,L}.
The expected hiring fee is a weighted average of the hiring fees of all types of workers in
both labor markets. With an increase in immigrants, the weight of unemployed immigrants
(U Ii /Ui) increases and the weight of unemployed natives (U
N
i /Ui) decreases. Since immi-
grants provide the greater surplus than native workers, the expected hiring fee increases
when the weight of unemployed immigrants increases. Figure 2.3 shows that an increase in
the number of immigrants shifts the curve HF to the right and increases market tightness.
Figure 2.3: Effects of immigration on labor market
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Lemma 6 The expected hiring fee in labor market i increases with Ii.
Intuitively, immigrants have a lower unemployment value than do natives, so they
pay a higher hiring fee than do natives. Since the hiring fee is the only revenue of firms, a
higher number of immigrants raises the expected revenue of firms, which encourages more
firms to enter the labor market and post vacancies. The average cost of a match increases
with the increase in the expected revenue to balance the equality of equation (2.13) and
move to the new equilibrium. Intuitively, firms are able to wait longer to hire a worker with
a higher expected revenue; therefore, market tightness goes up. Proposition 2 shows the
effect of an increase in immigrants on labor market tightness. According to lemma 6, labor
market tightness increases with the number of immigrants.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the market tightness in labor market i, θi, increases when
the number of skilled immigrants, Ii, increases.
As shown in (2.4) to (2.6) and (2.8), the reservation crime value depends on the
labor market tightness. When the market tightness goes up, unemployed workers can be
hired quickly. The value of unemployed workers goes up so unemployed workers prefer to
stay unemployed and wait for jobs instead of committing crime. The reservation crime
value of unemployed workers falls with the market tightness.
When market tightness increases, the increase in unemployment value shrinks
the employment premium, and the value of employment goes down. Employed workers
eventually end up being unemployed because they either lose their jobs or are incarcerated.
The transition rate from employment to unemployment is δ, and the transition rate from
prison to unemployment is ρ. If the incarceration duration is shorter than the duration of a
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job, which means that ρ > δ, and the value of unemployment increases, the value of workers
in jail goes up. Therefore, the opportunity cost of committing a crime for employed workers
drops and employed workers have more incentive to commit crime.
Lemma 7 If the market tightness θi increases,
i) g¯jE,i decreases if ρ > δ;
ii) g¯jU,i increases.
According to composition and criminal behavior effect, the effect of immigration
on the overall crime rate is ambiguous analytically. This is consistent with the ambiguity
found in empirical studies of the effects of immigration on crime.
2.5 Calibration
I calibrate the parameter values of the model using U.S. data from 1990 to 1999.
All the parameters are interpreted annually. As in Krusell et al. (2000b), I define skilled
workers as those who have at least a college degree, and unskilled workers as those without
any college degree. Using the empirical findings in Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) in
the 1990s, the measure of skilled immigrants IH is 0.036, and the measure of unskilled
immigrants IL is 0.089. The measure of skilled native workers γ is 0.274. The total native
population is normalized to 1. The productivity of skilled workers yH is also normalized to
1. The relative productivity of unskilled workers to skilled workers yL is 0.62, which targets
the wage premium between workers with college degrees and without college degrees. Based
on the estimation in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), I assume the matching function is
m(V,U) = AUαV 1−α and α to be 0.5. The bargaining power of workers β is 0.5, satisfying
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Hosios (1990a) condition. The average annual job separation rate is 0.228 and 0.408 in the
skilled and unskilled labor markets respectively. They are drawn from Chassamboulli and
Palivos (2014). The equilibrium market tightness θ and the constant recruitment cost ki
can be determined using (2.13) with a given job finding rate. Market tightness is normalized
to 1 without loss of generality; thus, the calibration of the matching efficiency A equals to
6.7455, and the constant recruitment cost kH is 0.4260 and kL is 0.5283.
11
Since the optimal employment contract requires that the wage equals to the pro-
ductivity of workers, the implied wage can be recovered using
w˜ji = yi − (r + δi + piµ(1− F (g¯jE,i)))φji . (2.25)
The implied wage is the difference between the productivity of workers and the flow hiring
fee, which is the second term of (4.16). The one-time hiring fee can be considered as
the present discounted value of a flow hiring fee at each point of time with the discount
rate r + s + piµ(1 − F (g¯jE,i)) during the time of employment. Given (4.16), the implied
wage of skilled native workers is 0.9829, and that of unskilled natives is 0.5958. Shimer
(2005) estimates that the replacement ratio of unemployment and employment income is
0.4. The unemployment utilities of skilled and unskilled natives are 0.3932 and 0.2383,
respectively. Following the estimation of Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), the wage gap
between skilled natives and immigrants is -18.8%, and the wage gap between unskilled
natives and immigrants is -19%. Thus the unemployment utilities of skilled and unskilled
immigrants are -1.7263 and -1.0703, respectively.
11The calibration strategy follows Pissarides (2009). Once the job finding rate and job separation rate
match the data, the labor market tightness can be normalized to one without loss of generality.
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I normalize all dollar figures in the data by the annualized earnings of workers over
25 years old with a bachelor’s degree and above in the CPS from 1990 to 1999; the amount
is $33,708.16. In the crime sector, the overall property crime rate targets the average
property crime rate from 1990 to 1999, which is 45.11 criminal offenses per 1,000 from
the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). I assume that the crime value follows an exponential
distribution.12 The average property loss per offense is approximately $1,318.8, so the
mean of the exponential distribution is ge = $1, 318.8/$33, 708.6 = 0.0391, which targets
the average property loss per offense and is normalized by the wage. The Poisson rate of
meeting a crime opportunity µ targets the crime rate, and equals to 0.0704. Since the loss
of crime is a wealth transfer from victims to criminals, I set the expected loss τ equal to the
mean of the crime value. The probability of getting caught is a ratio of the number of people
that are sent to jail to the total number of offenses, which is 0.019 following Engelhardt
et al. (2008). The mean length of incarceration of property crimes was 16 months in 2002,
which is also from Engelhardt et al. (2008). Hence the rate of being released is ρ = 0.75.
Because of lack of information on the utility flow in jail, I normalize this utility flow to
x = 0.13 The calibration is summarized in Table A.1.
2.6 Effects of Immigration: A Numerical Exercise
This section studies the quantitative impact of the immigration waves from 2000
to 2009. Using the findings in Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), the skilled and unskilled
12According to the UCR in 2004, the distribution of property crime value has a shape similar to an
exponential distribution.
13I also run numerical exercises with x = −0.5 and x = −1. The different flow utility values in jain do
not change the quantitative results significantly.
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immigrants increased by 0.026 and 0.051, respectively, in the 2000s. The simulation results
are presented in table A.2. Since productivity in the model is constant, and I focus only
on the long-run equilibrium, I de-trend the hourly real wage in the U.S. labor market. The
de-trended wage increases by 0.6 percentage points from the 1990s to the 2000s. The model
predicts that the implied wage of skilled natives increases by 0.21% and that of unskilled
native workers increases by 0.148%, with the wave of immigrants. Compared with the
de-trended wage, the impact of immigration on wages covers about 1/3 of the increase of
de-trended wages from the 1990s to the 2000s.14 Since immigrants create jobs for both
of natives and immigrants, the overall unemployment rate decreases by 0.3288 percentage
points.
Without effects from the labor market, the increase in immigrants in the 2000s
decreases the overall crime rate by 0.2455 per 1,000 population. Table A.3 reports the
respective crime rates of each type of worker in the 1990s. Skilled immigrants have lower
incentives to commit a crime than do unskilled immigrants. Unemployed skilled immigrants
are more willing to commit a crime than are employed skilled and unemployed natives,
but are less likely to commit a crime than other types of workers. Unemployed unskilled
immigrants have the lowest value in the legal sector, and, as a result, they are the most
likely to commit a crime. Employed unskilled immigrants have a reservation crime value
that is higher than that of unskilled natives and unskilled unemployed immigrants but lower
than that of other types of workers. When there is a wave of only skilled immigrants, the
14The reason I de-trended the wage is because the growth of wages is mainly driven by productivity
growth, which is absent in my model. According to CPS data, wage growth mainly follows productivity
growth in the 1990s and the 2000s. Since productivity in this paper is exogenous, I tried to compare the
model prediction with wage growth without productivity growth. Therefore, I use de-trended wages from
the 1990s to the 2000s and compared the de-trended wage growth with the model prediction.
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overall crime rate drops by 0.2724 per 1,000, and increases by 0.0148 when there is a wave
of only unskilled immigrants.
Immigrants also affect the criminal behavior of workers through the labor mar-
ket. According to propositions 4 and 5, employed workers commit more crimes because
jobs become less valuable with increasing labor market tightness. The opportunity cost of
committing a crime for employed workers goes down. Therefore, employed workers have
more incentives to commit crimes. Meanwhile, unemployed workers commit fewer crimes.
Unemployed workers are hired faster with increasing labor market tightness. The Survey
of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities in 1997 and 2004 shows that the
fraction of inmates who had a job before being arrested increased by 6.06%, whereas the
fraction of inmates who did not have a job before being arrested decreases. These survey
data support the model’s prediction regarding the change in criminal behavior of employed
and unemployed workers when the number of immigrants increases. Combining the compo-
sition and the criminal behavior effects, the overall crime rate decreases by 0.156 per 1,000,
which is equivalent to 45,988 nation-wide criminal offenses.15
Column 3 of table A.2 reports the results with an increase in skilled immigrants
only. Column 4 of table A.2 reports the results with an increase in unskilled immigrants only.
When the economy gains only skilled immigrants, the skilled market tightness increases by
0.3291, which lowers the unemployment rate by 0.1137 percentage points and increases
wages of skilled native workers by 0.13%. When there are more unskilled immigrants,
15The average population in the 2000s in the U.S. was 294,796,911. The estimated number of total criminal
offenses was 13,295,340.69.
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the unskilled labor market tightness increases by 0.1214. The overall unemployment rate
decreases by 0.2248 percentage points.
In the crime sector, the model predicts that the overall crime rate decreases by
0.226 (-0.061) offenses per 1,000 with an increase in skilled (unskilled) immigrants. Com-
pared to skilled immigrants, unskilled immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, since
they have a lower reservation crime value than skilled immigrants. Bell et al. (2013) and
Spenkuch (2014) provide empirical evidence that the crime rate in the host country in-
creases with immigrants from less-developed countries and decreases with the immigrants
from more developed countries.
2.7 Discussion: Policies
This section discusses three policies: an increase in unemployment income, an
increase in the duration of incarceration, and deportation.
2.7.1 Unemployment income
Machin and Marie (2006) and Fouge`re et al. (2009) document that unemployment
benefits affect workers’ criminal behavior. Because the measure of unemployment value is
the only difference between natives and immigrants, I introduce a more generous unemploy-
ment insurance system for immigrants. This unemployment insurance system increases the
unemployment income of immigrants and makes the flow of the unemployment utility of
immigrants equal to that of natives.
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Proposition 5 For all i ∈ {H,L} and j ∈ {N, I}, and i′ 6= i, an increase in BIi has the
following effects:
i) θi decreases;
ii) g¯NE,i and g¯
I
E,i′ increases if ρ > δ;
iii) g¯NU,i and g¯
I
U,i′ decreases;
iv) g¯IE,i decreases;
v) g¯IU,i increases.
With this unemployment insurance system, natives and immigrants are now the same in the
model. The increasing unemployment utility flow raises immigrants’ unemployment value.
The employment premium of immigrants decreases and lowers the expected revenue of firms.
As a result, fewer firms enter the market and post vacancies. Since the unemployment
value of immigrants goes up, immigrants are more patient and wait to find a job. More
unemployed workers and fewer vacancies decrease the labor market tightness in equilibrium.
Quantitatively, the market tightness decreases by 0.558 for the skilled market
and 0.2507 for the unskilled market. The overall unemployment rate increases by 0.8886
percentage points with this more generous unemployment insurance system. Because of the
drop in market tightness, skilled natives’ implied wage decreases by 0.31% and unskilled
natives’ implied wage decreases by 0.64%. The overall crime rate increases by 0.235 per
1,000 due to the mixed effects on different types of workers. With a less tight labor market,
native employees have high employment value and care about their jobs. Their opportunity
cost of committing a crime becomes higher, so they raise their reservation crime value
and commit fewer crimes. The crime rates of employed skilled and unskilled natives drop
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by 0.264 and 0.169, respectively. With lower labor market tightness, unemployed native
workers must wait longer to find a job. The native unemployment value and the reservation
crime value of unemployed natives decline. Therefore, criminal offenses that are committed
by unemployed natives increase. The crime rates of skilled and unskilled unemployed natives
increase by 0.149 and 0.238, respectively.
Unemployed immigrants enjoy a higher unemployment utility, even though it is
hard for them to get hired with low market tightness. They prefer to stay unemployed
rather than commit crimes. The number of crimes that are committed by unemployed im-
migrants decreases. As a result, the crime rate of unemployed skilled (unskilled) immigrants
decreases by 2.863 (5.17). Employed immigrants, by contrast, commit more crimes. A more
generous social security system narrows the difference between employed and unemployed
immigrants’ value, even though the market tightness decreases, employed immigrants have
a lower employment premium, so the opportunity cost of committing a crime drops. There-
fore, the crime rate of skilled (unskilled) employed immigrants increases by 4.558 (3.35).
The results are summarized in table A.4.
2.7.2 More severe jail sentences
The average duration of a jail sentence for property crimes is 16 months, which
provides an exit rate of ρ = 0.75. I extend the jail sentence to 32 months and to 48 months,
which implies exit rates ρ of 0.375 and 0.25, respectively. Table A.5 reports the policy
effects on labor market outcomes and crime rates.
Proposition 6 With a decrease in ρ,
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i) θi increases;
ii) g¯jE,i and g¯
j
U,i increase.
A longer jail duration directly lowers prisoners’ value. A worker needs to give up
more value in the legal sector when she wants to commit a crime. With a longer duration
of incarceration, many criminal opportunities are not of sufficiently high value to cover a
worker’s opportunity cost. Therefore, fewer workers get involved in criminal activities.
When the reservation crime value increases, workers’ valuation of their illegal out-
side option decreases. The value in the legal sector goes up, and this results in an increase
in the match surplus. There are fewer unemployed workers in the market when sentence
lengths increase. Criminals have to stay in jail longer, so fewer criminals return back to the
labor market. Also, employed workers commit fewer crimes, which lowers the transition rate
from employed to unemployed through criminal activity. When there are fewer unemployed
workers in the market, the number of vacancies per unemployed worker increases. Since this
incarceration policy affects the criminal behavior of all workers, the workers’ distribution
barely changes. Therefore, it shifts the curve HF to the right and increases market tightness
in equilibrium.
Quantitatively, there is no significant effect of more severe sentences on labor mar-
ket outcomes, but this policy reduces crime rates significantly. With the sentence extended
to 32 months and to 48 months, the overall crime rate decreases by 12.461 and 20.475 per
1,000, respectively.
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2.7.3 Deportation
Under a deportation policy, immigrants who commit a crime and get arrested are
sent back to their countries of origin. The assumption in this model is that some immi-
grants come from countries with worse labor markets than in the host country. Deportation
increases the opportunity cost of committing a crime for immigrants, so the reservation
crime value of immigrants rises.
I assume that the value of being deported is proportional to the value of being in
prison, i.e., for all i ∈ {H,L},
V ID,i = aV
I
P,i,
where the variable a ∈ [0, 1) is the proportion coefficient. Therefore, the criminal activity
payoff of immigrants is KIi = g + V
I
s,i + pi(V
I
D,i − V Is,i) and the reservation value of crime is
g¯Is,i = pi(V
I
s,i − V ID,i) = pi(V Is,i − aV IP,i). (2.26)
> pi(V Is,i − V jP,i)
which is higher than is that the one without deportation.
Since the deportation policy reduces the measure of immigrants over time, newly-
arriving immigrants enter the host country to ensure a steady state distribution with im-
migrants. All newcomers are unemployed. In steady state, immigrant flows are given by
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Figure 2.4: Immigrant flows
(θq(θ) + ηIU,i)U
I
i = IN,i + δE
I
i
(δ + ηIE,i)E
I
i = θq(θ)U
I
i
U Ii + E
I
i = Ii
for all i ∈ {H,L}, where IN,i is the measure of newly arriving immigrants. Therefore, the
measure of newcomers is
IN,i =
Ii[θq(θ)η
I
E,i + δη
I
U,i + η
I
E,iη
I
U,i]
θq(θ) + ηIE,i + δ
and the measure of unemployed immigrants is
U Ii =
Ii(δ + η
I
E,i)
θq(θ) + ηIE,i + δ
.
Proposition 7 With the deportation policy,
i) θi is ambiguous;
ii) g¯Is,i increases;
iii) g¯NU,i increases and g¯
N
E,i decreases if ρ > δ.
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Deportation policy is aimed at the criminal behavior of immigrants— it increases
the cost of committing a crime for immigrants only. The reservation crime value of im-
migrants increases, so the immigrants’ value of illegal outside options decreases. With
deportation, the value of the legal sector increases and the match surplus of immigrants
increases. However, with deportation, there are fewer unemployed immigrants in the labor
market than is the case without deportation. Without deportation, there are two flows into
immigrant unemployment: employed workers who lose their jobs and prisoners who are
released from jail. Only a proportion ρ of total prisoners are released from jail and return
to the labor market as unemployed workers. With deportation, there are also two flows
into immigrant unemployment: employed workers who lose their jobs and newly arrived
immigrants. The flows out of immigrant unemployment are the same with and without de-
portation. At the steady state, the number of newly-arriving immigrants equals the number
of immigrants being deported. The reservation crime value of immigrants increases so the
number of newcomers is less than the number of immigrants released from jail. There-
fore, the number of unemployed immigrants decreases with deportation, and the share of
unemployed immigrants goes down. Therefore, any changes in labor market tightness are
ambiguous when the deportation policy is imposed.
There is not enough information to measure the deportation value of immigrants,
so I set a = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 to represent three levels of immigrants’ original countries. If
an immigrant either comes from a country that has similar labor market conditions to the
host country or she can re-enter the host country easily, then the coefficient a = 0.9. If
an immigrant comes from a country with a worse labor market (such as a market with a
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high separation rate, low market tightness, or low wages) than that of the host country,
the coefficient a becomes 0.1. Table A.6 shows the effects of deportation on labor market
outcomes and the crime rates. The effect of deportation on workers’ distribution is limited.
When the reservation crime value of immigrants goes up with deportation, the share of
unemployed immigrants converges to that without deportation. The increase in the match
surplus due to the deportation policy is also small. Therefore, market tightness increases
by a small margin when the deportation policy is imposed. The reservation crime value
of native workers depends only on labor market tightness in this case, so the effect of
deportation on the criminal behavior of native workers is not significant. Comparing the
case of immigrants from more developed countries (a = 0.9) to the case of those from less
developed countries (a = 0.1), the effect on market tightness is almost the same, but the
effect on the criminal behavior of immigrants from different countries varies. The crime
rate decreases more when the coefficient a is smaller. When immigrants come from less-
developed countries, they pay a higher opportunity cost if they commit a crime. Fewer of
these immigrants commit crimes under the deportation policy. Thus, for immigrants from
a country with a labor market condition similar to that of the host country, the crime rate
decreases by 1.606 per 1,000. In the case of immigrants from a country where labor market
conditions are worse than in the host country, the deportation policy decreases the overall
crime rate by 3.973 (a = 0.5) and 4.481 (a = 0.1).
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2.8 Extension: imperfect substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor
The model above assumes that skilled and unskilled labor substitutes perfectly. For
a more realistic numerical exercise, this section extends the baseline model with imperfect
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.16
2.8.1 Production
There are two sectors in this extension, final and intermediate good sectors. Firms
in the final good sector produce final goods by purchasing intermediate goods from compet-
itive intermediate good markets. There are two intermediate goods, skilled and unskilled
intermediate goods. They are produced by skilled/unskilled labor. Firms in the intermedi-
ate good sector hire workers from the skilled/unskilled labor market.
The output of the final good follows the CES production function with constant
returns to scale,
Y = [αY σH + (1− α)Y σL ]1/σ, (2.27)
where variable Y is the production of final good, YH is the production of the skilled inter-
mediate good, and YL is the production of the unskilled intermediate good. The parameter
α represents the importance of the skilled intermediate good. The parameter σ represents
16I only show the extension with imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in the
manuscript. I also have a numerical exercise with imperfect substitution between native and immigrant
workers, and between skilled and unskilled labor and native and immigrant workers together. These two
extensions do not significantly change the baseline results, so they are not in the manuscript. The numer-
ical results of these two extensions are available upon request. I am grateful to an anonymous referee who
suggested having imperfect substitution between different types of workers.
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the elasticity of substitution, which is 1/(1−σ). One employed skilled/unskilled worker, re-
gardless of their immigration status, produces one unit of the skilled/unskilled intermediate
good, i.e.
YH = E
N
H + E
I
H , (2.28)
YL = E
N
L + E
I
L. (2.29)
Firms in the final good sector purchase intermediate goods in competitive markets.
The prices of intermediate goods are the marginal product of skilled/unskilled intermediate
goods, which are
pH = α[α+ (1− α)( YL
YH
)σ]
1−σ
σ , (2.30)
pL = (1− α)[α( YL
YH
)−σ + (1− α)] 1−σσ . (2.31)
2.8.2 Effects of immigration
Firms in the intermediate good sector search and match workers in the labor
markets. The matching mechanism is the same as in the baseline model. The equilibrium
is determined by
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ki
q(θi)
= φei
=
1− β
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
E
[
pi −Bji − µ
∫ g¯E,i
g¯U,i
(1− F (g))dg
]
. (2.32)
The imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor provides an addi-
tional channel for the effects of immigration. This channel is called the price channel. When
the population of skilled/unskilled immigrants increase, there is more skilled/unskilled la-
bor in the labor markets. As a result, the production of the skilled/unskilled intermediate
good increases and the price of skilled/unskilled labor decreases, while the price of un-
skilled/skilled labor increases.
Lemma 8 When Ii increases,
(i) pi decreases,
(ii) pi′ increases for all i
′ ∈ {H,L}, and i′ 6= i.
According to lemma 8, the population of immigrants affects the reservation value
of crime through the price channel.
Lemma 9 Given a certain θi, when Ii increases,
(i) g¯js,i decreases,
(ii) g¯js,i′ increases,
for all i, i′ ∈ {H,L}, s ∈ {E,U}, j ∈ {N, I}.
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The price channel also affects the labor market equilibrium. Differing from the
baseline model, the price channel weakens the effect of immigration on the labor market
outcomes. The equilibrium condition (2.33) can be rewritten as
ki
q(θi)
+
1− β
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
E
[
Bji − µ
∫ g¯E,i
g¯U,i
(1− F (g))dg
]
=
1− β
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
pi. (2.33)
The left hand side of equation (2.33) can be considered the total cost of a match:
an average cost from job posting and the expected value of workers’ outside option. The
right hand side represents the share of intermediate good price that firms can get. When
the population of skilled-i immigrants increases, the total cost of a match decreases while
the price of the skilled-i intermediate good decreases as well. The market tightness of labor
market i increases with skilled-i immigrants only if the effect on the cost is greater than
the effect on the price.
Proposition 8 When Ii increases,
(i) θi increases if the cost effect dominates the price effect;
(ii) θi′ increases for all i
′ ∈ {H,L}, i′ 6= i.
Imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor contributes more am-
biguity to the effects of immigration on labor market outputs and crime. Table A.7 shows
the simulation results of the extended model.
45
2.9 Conclusion
This paper studies the joint impact of immigration on labor market outcomes
and crime. A wave of immigrants encourages firms to create more jobs, since it reduces
firms’ labor costs. With this wave of immigrants, the unemployment rate of native workers
decreases, and the wages of native workers increase. Immigration affects workers’ criminal
behavior by changing workers’ distribution and raising labor market tightness. Compared
to skilled immigrants, unskilled immigrants are more likely commit crimes because of their
poor outside options. Therefore, the overall crime rate decreases with an increase in skilled
immigrants, but increases with an increase in unskilled immigrants. Immigration also affects
the criminal behavior of workers by raising labor market tightness. More employed workers
commit a crime if the duration of incarceration is shorter than the duration of employment.
With this increase in labor market tightness, unemployed workers prefer to wait for jobs
rather than commit crimes. Therefore, the effect of immigration on the overall crime rate
is ambiguous.
Quantitatively, with the increase in both skilled immigrants and unskilled immi-
grants observed in the 2000s, the unemployment rate decreased by 0.3288 percentage points,
and the crime rate decreased by 0.156 per 1,000 population. The model also discusses pol-
icy effects. With a more generous unemployment insurance system for immigrants, the
unemployment and the crime rates increase, and the wages of native workers decrease.
Deportation and a longer incarceration duration lower the crime rate by increasing the
opportunity cost of committing a crime. The former affects the criminal behavior of both
native and immigrant workers, but the latter affects only the criminal behavior of immi-
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grants. Thus, the magnitude of the effect of incarceration is larger than the deportation
policy.
47
Chapter 3
Endogenous immigration behavior
and effects of immigration policies
3.1 Introduction
Since the 2000s, the cost of relocation has become cheaper with increases in tech-
nology. The reduction of moving cost makes workers relocate more frequently than in the
past. This increasing global labor mobility is an important topic as the public is concerned
about how to control the increased labor movement, particularly as it pertains to the effect
of immigrants on the local labor market. A lot of literature has talked about how immi-
grants affect the labor market in the host country but the results are not conclusive. For
example, Borjas (2003b; 2005) finds that immigration reduces natives’ wages, but Ottaviano
and Peri (2012) and Peri et al. (2015) provide evidence of the opposite effect.
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However, most literature assumes that labor mobility is exogenous and only moves
with one direction. They focus on effects on local labor market when the exogenous stock
of immigrant increases and provide some policy analysis. In fact, the stock of immigrants
depends on the migration behavior of workers endogenously and highly related the labor
market conditions, especially incomes and unemployment rates. Greenwood (1969) provides
evidence that income and unemployment significantly affect people’s migration. In addition,
workers move with double direction between two countries. For example, there are about
363,000 US-born workers in Canada and about 1 million Canadians live in the US. There
are about 1 million Mexicans in the United States and about 669,000 Americans in Mexico
in 2015. The local labor market is affected by both population inflows and outflows.
This paper studies effects of immigration policy on labor market outcomes by
modeling the migration behavior in frictional labor markets. There are two countries and
two skill-bias labor markets. All workers are able to immigrate to the other country legally.
Country 1 has more high skilled workers and better technology and social security system
(e.g. the U.S.) and country 2 has more low skilled workers and lower technology and social
security system (e.g. Mexico). When skilled workers stay in the country of origin, they
are able to search in the skilled and unskilled labor market. Unskilled workers only can
search in the unskilled labor market, since they cannot achieve the skill requirements of the
skilled labor market, for example, the requirement of college degrees. Skilled and unskilled
workers can also choose to emigrate to the other country when a migration opportunity
arrives. The migration opportunity comes with a migration cost. This migration cost
includes relocation costs, search cost in the foreign country and the benefit that workers
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give up in their country of origin. The reservation migration cost is determined by the
comparison of the unemployment value in the country of origin and the foreign country
of the worker. If the labor market in the foreign country compensates more than the
reservation migration cost, workers search in the foreign country and relocate.
Theoretically, skilled workers from either country 1 or country 2 may emigrate
to the other country while unskilled workers only emigrate from country 2 to country 1
at the steady state equilibrium. The model is calibrated to the labor market data in the
U.S. and Mexico in 2010. The model shows that skilled U.S.-born and Mexican workers
migrate to each other, while only Mexican unskilled workers migrate to the United States
but no unskilled US-born workers move to Mexico. The model predicts that there are 2%
of skilled workers in Mexico are US-born workers, 1.62% of skilled workers and 10% of
unskilled workers in the US are Mexicans.
I introduce three immigration policies in the United States and one in Mexico that
are able to apply in this model. The subsidy of firms in the United States that hire U.S.-born
workers encourages more firms to enter the labor market in the United States. Therefore
the market tightnesses in skilled and unskilled labor market in the United States increase.
This policy increases the wages and decreases the unemployment rate in the United States.
The labor markets in the US attract more workers from Mexico. Meanwhile, the market
tightnesses in both skilled and unskilled labor markets in Mexico decrease and it leads a
decrease in wages and an increase in unemployment rates. The taxation of firms in the
United States that hire Mexicans decreases the labor market tightnesses in both skilled and
unskilled labor markets. This taxation decreases wages and increases unemployment rates
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in the United States. The labor markets in the U.S. become less attractive to Mexicans so
that fewer Mexicans move to the US. Mexican government tries to attract more US-born
skilled workers to immigrate to Mexico because these workers have higher productivity. To
attract these workers, Mexico subsidizes all U.S.-born workers who search in Mexico. The
labor markets in Mexico become stronger, which means wages increase and unemployment
rates decrease. Since the labor markets in Mexico become attractive, fewer Mexicans move
to the US.
This paper is the first one that captures double-direction immigration flows be-
tween two countries. Chassamboulli and Peri (2015b) and Ortega (2000) endogenize migra-
tion behavior with two-country search and matching framework. Chassamboulli and Peri
(2015b) studies the effects of illegal immigrants from Mexico on the labor market outcomes
in the United States. They assume that there is only immigrants from Mexico and there is
no migration opportunity for workers who were born in the US. All immigrants from Mexico
are unskilled workers. The US-born workers cannot search across markets or countries. My
paper releases these assumptions that US-born workers are allowed to search across market
or countries with a heterogenous migration cost. Ortega (2000) assumes that all workers
search in the other country when the job duration is longer in that country than their
country of origin. My paper introduce heterogenous migration opportunities that workers
can choose to emigrate or to stay in their own country. With the model in this paper, the
effects of immigration polices on labor market outcomes and the population of immigrants
are trackable.
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Other papers that studies effects of immigration with frictional labor market as-
sume that immigration is an exogenous variable. Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) in-
troduce imperfect substitution with skilled-bias labor markets to show that immigration
benefit native workers from wages and employments. Liu (2010) shows that an increase in
illegal immigrants generate a significant social welfare gain. Liu et al. (2017) introduces
mismatch and imperfect transferability of foreign human capital in the search and match-
ing labor market model with immigrants. They shows that with the increase of immigrants
in 2000 to 2009 in the United States, all workers in the US gain in terms of income and
employment.
The paper describes a frictional labor market with two countries and two labor
markets. The steady state equilibrium of the model is recursively solved. In steady state
equilibrium, the flows of immigrants from the U.S. and Mexico may occur simultaneously
in the skilled labor market, while there is only Mexican immigrants come to the US in the
unskilled labor market. The model is calibrated to the US and Mexico labor market data
in 2010. Some immigration policy effects on labor market outcomes are discussed in section
7.
3.2 Model
Time is continuous. Firms and workers are risk neutral and discount the future
value at a rate r. There are two countries and two skill level of workers. High skilled
workers in both countries have higher productivity than low skilled workers. Country 1 has
more high skilled workers while country 2 has fewer high skilled workers and more unskilled
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workers. Unemployed workers in country 1 has higher unemployment benefit than in country
2. Country 1 has more advanced technology and education than country 2. Therefore, the
productivity of skilled and unskilled worker in country 1 is higher than in country 2, which
is yAlso, skilled workers emigrate from country 1 to country 2 have higher productivity
than skilled workers who were born in country 2. Unskilled workers from country 1 that
move to country 2 have the same productivity as unskilled workers who were born country
2. Skilled and unskilled workers from country 2 that move to country 1 have the same
productivity. High skilled workers are free to search in either high skilled labor market
or low skilled labor market, but low skilled workers are able to search in the low skilled
labor market only. Meanwhile, unemployed workers can also consider searching in the other
country, if the other country provide higher value in the labor market. If workers search in
the other country, they cannot search across markets, i.e. high (low) skilled foreigners can
only search in high (low) skilled labor market. All workers legally search across countries.
Unemployment exists because of the search frictions in the labor market. For all
i ∈ {1, 2}, skilled unemployed workers who were born in country i and search in country
i obtain a flow of unemployment benefit bHii . The superscript κ represents skill level of
workers, where H for high skill and L for low skill. The subscript with two digits represents
the country i that workers were born and the country j that workers search/work. If i = j,
this worker was born in country i and stays in country i. If i 6= j, this worker was born
in country i and emigrates to country j. If skilled workers stays in their country of origin,
they search in the high skilled labor market and the low skilled market at the same time.
Unskilled unemployed workers who were born in country i and search in country i obtain
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a flow of unemployment benefit bLii. They are only able to search in the low skilled labor
market because they lack skills that the high skilled labor market requires. An migration
opportunity arrives at a Poisson rate µi to both skilled and unskilled unemployed workers.
This migration opportunity requires that workers need to pay a one-time search cost c,
to search in the other country j. This migration cost is randomly drawn from a given
distribution F (c) on support [0, cmax). The migration cost is one-time cost that includes
the relocation cost, the present discounted cost of flows of search cost in the foreign country,
and the benefit that the immigrant worker gives up when she was in her country of origin.
All migrations are considered in this model is legal migration.
If these unemployed workers stay in their country of origin, they match with a firm
in country i. The number of matches generates in high (low) skilled labor market in country
i follows a match function, Mκi = m(V
κ
i , U
κ
i ) where V
κ
i is the number of vacancies and U
κ
i
is the number of unemployed workers in κ-skilled labor market in country i. As a result, an
unemployed worker matches with a firm at a Poisson rate f(θκi ) = M
κ
i /U
κ
i , where tightness
θκi is defined as the vacancy-unemployment ratio, i.e. θ
κ
i ≡ V κi /Uκi . Skilled unemployed
workers match with a firm in skilled labor market at rate f(θHi ) or match with a firm in
unskilled labor market at rate f(θLi ). Unskilled unemployed workers match with a firm in
the unskilled labor market at rate f(θLi ). When the skilled (unskilled) worker matches in
the skilled (unskilled) labor market, she earns wages wHii (w
L
ii) and suffers the capital loss
when an exogenous separation shock, which arrives at rate sH (sL). Similarly, if the skilled
worker works in the unskilled labor market, she earns wages wHLii and suffers the capital
loss of job separation in the unskilled labor market.
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If the search in the foreign country is low, workers decide to search in the other
country. If they search in the foreign country j (workers were born in country i 6= j), they
obtain a flow of unemployment benefit bHij or b
L
ij , according to their skills. High (low) skilled
workers from country i are only able to search in high (low) skilled labor market. Workers
from country i match with a firm in country j with rate f(θκj ). They earn wages w
κ
ij and
suffer the capital loss of job separation at rate sκ. An exogenous departure shock arrives
at rate d such that all workers from country i have to return to their country of origin and
become unemployed.
All firms in this model are small firms and each of them only has one job, vacant
or filled. They can post a vacant job freely in either skilled or unskilled labor market in the
country i that they locate. Firms are not able to move. When firms post a vacant job, they
pay a constant recruitment cost kκ. They match with a worker at a rate q(θκi ) = M
κ
i /V
κ
i .
When firms and workers match with each other, they start producing. Firms receive yκji
units of production from the worker that they hire. Similar as the interpretation of the
subscript of individual variables, the first digit represents the country that workers were
born and the second digit represents the location of the firm. They pay wage wκji to the
worker. If firms in country i hire a worker from country j, they lose their employee by
either the separation shock or the departure shock. If employees are from country i, firms
in country i lose them only because of the separate shock.
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3.3 Bellman equations
3.3.1 Workers
The value of employed workers with skilled κ who were born in country i and work
in country j is denoted asWκij , the value of unemployed workers as Uκij . Skilled workers who
were born and work in the same country can search in the skilled and unskilled labor market
simultaneously. The value of a skilled worker that works in the unskilled labor market is
denoted as WHLii . Equation (3.1) shows that employed skilled workers match with a firm in
skilled labor market. Equation (3.2) shows that a skilled worker gets a job in the unskilled
labor market. Equation (3.3) shows that the outside options of skilled workers. It includes
the flow of unemployment benefit, the expected capital gain of getting a job, and the surplus
value of migration. When the migration opportunity arrives, the worker compares the value
of unemployment when she searches oversea with the cost of migration, and the value of
unemployment when she stays in country i. The bellman equations of skilled workers who
were born in country i and work in country j are
rWHii = wHii − sH(WHii − UHii ) (3.1)
rWHLii = wHLii − sL(WHLii − UHii ) (3.2)
rUHii = bHii + f(θHi )(WHii − UHii ) + f(θLi )(WHLii − UHii ) + µi
∫ ∞
0
max{UHji − UHii − c, 0}dF (c)
(3.3)
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If she decides to search in country j, she can only search in skilled market. The bellman
equations when the worker decide to search and to work in country j are following,
rWHij = wHij − sH(WHij − UHij )− d(WHij − UHii ) (3.4)
rUHij = bHij + f(θHj )(WHij − UHij )− d(UHij − UHii ). (3.5)
When the departure shock arrives, employed or unemployed skilled workers in country j
have to return to country i and become unemployed. The capital loss of the departure
shock is showed in the last term of equations (3.4) and (3.5).
The value functions of unskilled workers are similar. The only difference is that
unskilled workers are only able to search in the unskilled labor market. Therefore, the
bellman equations of unskilled workers who were born in country i are
rWLii = wLii − sL(WLii − ULii ) (3.6)
rULii = bLii + f(θLi )(WLii − ULii ) + µi
∫ ∞
0
max{Uκij − Uκii − c, 0}dF (c) (3.7)
rWLij = wLij − sL(WLij − ULij)− d(WLij − ULii ) (3.8)
rULij = bLij + f(θLj )(WLij − ULij)− d(WLij − ULij). (3.9)
3.3.2 Firms
Firms in country i can post a vacancy and match with a worker in either the skilled
labor market or the unskilled labor market. The value of a vacant job is denoted as Vκi
and the value of a filled job as J κii , where the first digit of the subscription represents the
57
country that the employee was born and the second digit represents the location of the firm.
If a firm posts a vacancy in the skilled labor market, its bellman equations are following,
rVHi = −kH + q(θHi )(EJHi − VHi ) (3.10)
rJHii = yHii − wHii − sH(JHii − VHi ) (3.11)
rJHji = yHji − wHji − (sH + d)(JHji − VHi ). (3.12)
Firms do not know the types of workers, either from country i or j, before they matches, but
firms can observe the unemployed skilled workers’ distribution in the market. Therefore,
when a firm posts a vacancy, it has an expected capital gain of a match. The expected value
of a filled job is EJHi = (UHii /UHi )JHii + (UHji /UHi )JHji , where the total unemployment in
the skilled market in country i is UHi = U
H
ii + U
H
ji , the sum of skilled unemployed workers
from country i and j. Similarly, the bellman equations of a firm that posts a vacancy in
the unskilled labor market in country i are
rVLi = −kL + q(θLi )(EJ Li − VLi ) (3.13)
rJ Lii = yLii − wLii − sL(J Lii − VLi ) (3.14)
rJHLii = yHLii − wHLii − sL(JHLii − VLi ) (3.15)
rJ Lji = yLji − wLji − sL(J Lji − VLi ), (3.16)
where the expected value of unskilled filled job is EJ Li = [ULii /(ULi +UHii )]J Lii + [ULji/(ULi +
UHii )]J Lji +[UHii /(ULi +UHii )]JHLii and the total low skilled unemployment is ULi = ULii +ULji.
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The wage are determined by Nash bargaining. The bargaining power of workers
is denoted as β. Workers and firms devide the match surplus by their bargaining power.
If workers stay in their country of origin and work in the market that match with their
skill, the surplus of workers is Wκii−Uκii. If workers move to the other country, their surplus
becomesWκij−Uκij . Skilled workers can search in the unskilled labor market in their country
of origin. Therefore the surplus of these mismatched workers is WHLii − UHLii . Similarly,
firms’ surplus in κ-skilled labor market in country i is J κii − Vκi if firms match with a
worker who was born in the same country, J κji − Vκi if they match with a worker comes
from the other country. If firms are in the unskilled labor market, they may match with a
skilled worker who was born in the same country as the firm. Hence the surplus of firms
that mismatch with a skilled worker is JHLii − VHi . The surplus maximization problems
of skilled-κ workers who were born in country i or j and work in country i are written as
following,
wκii = arg max(Wκii − Uκii)β(J κii − Vκi )1−β (3.17)
wκji = arg max(Wκji − Uκji)β(J κji − Vκi )1−β (3.18)
wHLii = arg max(WHLii − UHii )β(JHLii − VLi )1−β. (3.19)
When skilled workers search in the unskilled labor market, their productivity is
higher than unskilled workers but lower than when they work with a skilled job. If skilled
workers work with an unskilled job, the value of this job should be at least the same as
the unemployment value of skilled workers, i.e. WHLii ≥ UHii . Otherwise, no skilled workers
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search in the unskilled labor market. Proposition 1 concludes the condition of the existence
of mismatch.
Proposition 9 Mismatch of skilled workers in unskilled labor market exists if
r + sH + βf(θHi )
r + sH
yHLii ≥
βf(θHi )
r + sH
yHii + b
H
ii + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0
F (c)dc..
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.
3.3.3 Reservation migration cost
When the migration opportunity arrives, workers can accept the opportunity and
pay the one-time cost of migration, or reject and stay in the country that they were born.
This one-time cost of migration includes the cost of relocation, the opportunity cost of
moving out of the original country, and the discounted present value of the flow of search
cost in the foreign country. When the worker moves to the other country, she loses her
benefit in her country of origin and suffers some hardship in the new country. Therefore
when she moves, the new country needs to compensate her equal or more than her cost.
If the cost of migration is equal to the compensation from the new country, this cost is
the reservation cost of migration. If the cost of migration is higher than the reservation,
workers reject the opportunity and stay in the country of origin. Otherwise, they migrate
to the new country. The determination of this reservation cost is the comparison between
the value of unemployment in the other country and in the country of origin. Intuitively, if
migration costs more than the worker can gain, then she rejects the migration opportunity.
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Therefore, the reservation migration cost is
c¯κi = max{Uκij − Uκii, 0}. (3.20)
The reservation cost is non-negative. When c¯κi = 0, there is no worker with skill κ emigrates
from country i.
3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by the equality between the average cost of a match
and the expected revenue from a match. This equality is given by the job creation condition,
according to the free entry condition of vacancy, Vκi = 0. In the unskilled labor market in
country i, the job creation condition is written as
kL
q(θLi )
=
UHii
ULi + U
H
ii
JHLii +
ULii
ULi + U
H
ii
J Lii +
ULji
ULi + U
H
ii
J Lji . (3.21)
According to the environment of the model, there are three types of workers search in
the unskilled labor market: skilled and unskilled workers who were born in country i and
unskilled workers who were born in country j. Similarly, the job creation condition of the
skilled labor market in country i is
kH
q(θHi )
=
UHii
UHi
JHii +
UHji
UHi
JHji (3.22)
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At the steady state, the flows into and out of employment and unemployment are equal to
each other.
Figure 3.1: Workers flows
According to figure 1, the flows into and out of each country equal each other,
i.e. µF (c¯κi )U
κ
ii = d(E
κ
ii + U
κ
ii). In country i, the flows into skilled unemployment are
employed workers lose their jobs in skilled and unskilled market, and the returned workers
from country j. The flows out of skilled unemployed workers are workers who get a job in
the skilled or unskilled labor market, and workers who decide to search in country j. For
unskilled unemployment, the inflows are the unskilled employees who lose their jobs and
the workers return from country j. The outflows of unskilled unemployment in country i
are workers who get a job and the ones who decide to search in the unskilled labor market
in country j.
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In country j, the flows into the skilled (unskilled) unemployment are workers
coming from country i and the ones who lose their jobs. The flows out of the skilled
(unskilled) unemployment are workers who get a job and the ones who return to country
i. The following equations show the equality of flows into and out of employment and
unemployment,
Hi = E
H
ii + E
HL
ii + U
H
ii + E
H
ij + U
H
ij (3.23)
1−Hi = ELii + ULii + ELij + ULij (3.24)
d(Eκij + U
κ
ij) = µF (c¯
κ
i )U
κ
ii (3.25)
sκEκij = f(θ
κ
j )U
κ
ij (3.26)
[f(θHi ) + f(θ
L
i ) + µF (c¯
H
i ))]U
H
ii = s
HEHii + s
LEHLii + d(E
H
ij + U
H
ij ) (3.27)
[f(θLi ) + µF (c¯
L
i )]U
L
ii = s
LELii + d(E
L
ij + U
L
ij). (3.28)
With this system of equations, the steady state equilibrium is defined as a set of
variables: the market tightness in skilled and unskilled labor market, the distribution of
workers, and the reservation migration cost.
Definition 2 The steady state equilibrium in country i is a set of variables, {θHi , θLi , Uκii, Eκii, Uκji, Eκji, EHLii , c¯κi }
for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, κ ∈ {H,L}, such that: θHi satisfies (3.22); θLi satisfies (3.21);
{Uκii, Eκii, Uκji, Eκji, EHLii } satisfy (3.23) – (3.28); c¯κi satisfies (3.20).
The equilibrium in country i is recursively solvable. Given any certain θκi , the
workers distribution at steady state is solved by equations (3.23) to (3.28). The wage is
determined by equation (3.17) to (3.19). The reservation migration cost is given by (3.20).
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At the end, (3.21) and (3.22) solve the equilibrium labor market tightness in κ-skilled labor
market in country i. The solution of wages, unemployment and the reservation costs are
presented in the appendix.
At the steady state, some of skilled workers in both country 1 and country 2 may
migrate simultaneously but the flows of unskilled immigrants are only from country 2 to
country 1. According to the assumption in this economy, skilled workers from country 1
have high productivity than skilled worker from country 2, even they are in country 2.
When these skilled workers move to country 2, their unemployment benefit is relatively
lower than when they are in country 1. Therefore, the surplus of a skilled job in country 2
with a skilled worker from country 1 can be high enough to compensate the migration cost
of skilled workers from country 1. For unskilled workers from country 1, they have high
productivity and unemployment benefit in country 1 so that there is no enough compen-
sation to motivate them to relocate to country 2. Unskilled workers in country 2 benefit
from the high productivity and unemployment benefit so that they are willing to move to
country 1 and gain more from the match in country 1. Therefore, the match surplus of an
unskilled job is always higher in country 1 than country 2.
Proposition 10 At steady state,
i) c¯H1 > 0 if
βf(θHj )y
H
ij + (r + s
H + d)bHij
r + sH + d+ βf(θHj )
>
bHii + βf(θ
H
i )y
H
ii /(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )y
L
ii/(r + s
L) + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θHi )/(r + s
L)
;
ii) c¯H2 > 0;
iii) c¯L1 = 0;
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iv) c¯L2 > 0.
3.5 Calibration
The parameter value in the model is calibrated to the labor market data in the
United States and Mexico. Assume that country 1 represents the U.S. and country 2
represents Mexico. All parameters are presented monthly. The population in the U.S. is
normalized to 1 so that the population in Mexico is 1/3. According to Krusell et al. (2000a),
skilled workers are defined as the ones who have at least a college degree and unskilled
workers are defined as the ones who do not have any college education. According to IPUMS
International 2010 in the U.S. and in Mexico, the measure of skilled worker is 0.3144 in the
U.S. and 0.0265 in Mexico. The productivity gap between skilled and unskilled workers
targets the wage premium of education. In the U.S., the productivity of skilled workers
who were born in the U.S. is normalized to 1 and the productivity of U.S.-born unskilled
workers is 0.4699. The productivity of mismatched U.S.-born skilled worker is 0.6833. The
mismatch productivity targets to the wage gap between the skilled U.S.-born workers works
with a unprofessional job and with a professional job in the U.S. There is also a productivity
gap between workers who are from the U.S. and from Mexico. The productivity gap between
two countries targets to the gap of the total factor productivity between two countries.
Therefore, the productivity of Mexico-born skilled workers is 0.6944 and the productivity
of unskilled Mexican is 0.1968. The productivity of mismatched skilled Mexican workers is
0.1240 that targets the wage gap between skilled Mexican workers with professional jobs and
with unprofessional jobs. Because U.S. skilled workers have better education than Mexican
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skilled worker, the productivity of U.S.-born skilled workers works in Mexico is 0.9561,
which targets the wage gap between U.S.-born and Mexican skilled workers. Mexican skilled
and unskilled workers have the same productivity as U.S.-born skilled and unskilled workers
when they work in the U.S. The U.S.-born unskilled workers also have the same productivity
as Mexican unskilled workers. Since the productivity of skilled U.S. and Mexican workers in
the the U.S. is the same, the wage gap between U.S. workers comes from the difference of the
unemployment benefit. From IPUMS International U.S. data in 2010, the wage gap between
skilled U.S. and Mexican workers is -0.4305. The unemployment benefit in the U.S. is 71%
to the employment income from Hall (2005). Therefore, the unemployment benefit of U.S.
skilled workers is 0.7345 and of Mexican skilled workers who work in the U.S. is 0.5134. The
unemployment benefit in Mexico is 40% to the employment income, assuming that it is equal
to the lower bound of the U.S. unemployment benefit from Shimer (2005). Therefore, the
unemployment benefit of skilled and unskilled Mexicans are 0.2397 and 0.0774 respectively.
The unemployment benefit of U.S.-born skilled and unskilled workers in Mexico targets to
the wage gap between U.S. and Mexican unskilled workers in Mexican. As a result, the
unemployment benefit of U.S.-born skilled and unskilled workers in Mexico is 0.2397 and
0.0774 respectively.
The matching function follows Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), which ism(V Hi , U
H
i ) =
A(V Hi )
1−α(UHi )
α for skilled labor market and m(V Li , U
L
i + U
H
ii ) = A(V
L
i )
1−α(ULi + U
H
ii )
α.
The unemployment elasticity of the matching function α is 0.5 from Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2001). The bargaining power of workers β is 0.5, which satisfies Hosios (1990b)
condition. The value of the exogenous departure rate, separation rates in the skilled and
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unskilled labor market, and the labor market tightness in both country are from Chassam-
boulli and Peri (2015b), which are 0.0023, 0.024, 0.032, and 0.62 respectively. The matching
technology A targets the employment rate in the U.S., which is 0.9520 in the skilled labor
market and 0.8743 in the unskilled labor market. As a result, the matching technology A is
equal to 0.3501. The constant recruitment cost in the skilled and unskilled labor market are
0.6906 and 0.0630, which are calibrated to the job creation conditions in the U.S. following
equation (3.22) and (3.21) when i = 1. At the end, the arrival rate of migration opportunity
µ is 1.0456× 10−4, which matches the flows of skilled workers from Mexico to the U.S.
3.6 Discussion: immigration policy examples
This section discusses three immigration policy examples that policy maker may
be concerned about to attract or decrease immigrants.
3.6.1 Subsidy of firms
The US government can pay subsidy to encourage firms in the United States to
hire more US-born workers. When firms in the United States match with a worker from
the US, they can receive a one-time subsidy γ from the government. Therefore the value of
vacancies in the US becomes
rVH1 = −kH + q(θH1 )[
UH11
UH1
(JH11 + γ) +
UH21
UH1
JH21 ] (3.29)
rVL1 = −kL + q(θL1 )[
UL11
UL1 + U
H
11
(J L11 + γ) +
UH11
UL1 + U
H
11
(JHL11 + γ) +
UL21
UL1 + U
H
11
J L21]. (3.30)
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When firms receive the subsidy, the expected value of a match increases. The market tight-
ness increases when more firms enter to the labor market in the United States. Therefore,
the wages in the US increase and the unemployment in the US decreases. The U.S. labor
markets become more attractive to Mexicans, both of skilled and unskilled workers. More
Mexicans move to the US.
This policy also affects the labor markets in Mexico. When the labor market in the
US is attractive, the reservation migration cost of Mexicans increases. This increase in the
reservation migration cost drives the wage of both skilled and unskilled Mexicans increase
and the unemployment rate of unskilled Mexicans decrease. According to equation (3.21),
this increase in wages reduces the expected surplus of a filled job in Mexico. Therefore, the
labor market tightnesses in Mexico decrease. The unemployment rate of skilled Mexicans
increases because the effect of decreasing market tightnesses dominates the effect of the
increasing reservation migration cost.
Proposition 11 With an increase in the subsidy γ, for all κ ∈ {H,L},
i) the labor market tightness in the skilled-κ market θκ1 in the U.S. increases;
ii) the wages of skilled-κ in the U.S. increases;
iii) the unemployment rate in skilled-κ in the U.S. decreases;
iv) the immigrants with skilled κ from Mexico to the U.S. increases;
v) the skilled immigrants from the U.S. to Mexico increases.
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3.6.2 Taxation of firms
The US government taxes firms that hire foreign workers to reduce firms incentives
to hire foreigners. When firms match with a Mexican, they need to pay a one-time tax φ.
Therefore the value of vacancies of firms in the US becomes
rVH1 = −kH + q(θH1 )[
UH11
UH1
JH11 +
UH21
UH1
(JH21 − φ)] (3.31)
rVL1 = −kL + q(θL1 )[
UL11
UL1 + U
H
11
J L11 +
UH11
UL1 + U
H
11
JHL11 +
UL21
UL1 + U
H
11
(J L21 − φ)]. (3.32)
This tax makes the expected match value lower. Fewer firms enter the labor market in the
U.S. therefore the labor market tightness decreases. The labor markets in the United States
are less attractive to the Mexicans because the unemployment rate and wages in the United
States decrease. As a result, the share of Mexicans in Mexico increases. Per the change in
the labor markets in Mexico, the labor market tightnesses in Mexico decrease. The labor
markets in Mexico are less attractive to US workers as well. Therefore, this taxation police
decreases the labor mobility between Mexico and the US. Since the labor market tightness
in skilled labor market in the US decreases, more skilled workers get a job in the unskilled
labor market. Even though the unskilled labor market goes down with the tax as well, the
mismatched workers from skilled labor market bring higher expected match surplus. This
mismatch increases the market tightness in the unskilled labor market in the US.
Proposition 12 With an increase in φ, or all κ ∈ {H,L},
i) the labor market tightness of the skilled-κ labor market in the U.S. decreases;
ii) the unemployment of skilled-κ labor market in the U.S. increases;
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iii) the wages of skilled-κ workers in the U.S. decrease;
iv) the skilled-κ immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. decrease;
v) the skilled immigrants from the U.S. to Mexico decreases.
3.6.3 Taxation of Mexicans
Another way to control the Mexican immigrants move to the United States is to
tax them and control their migration cost. If Mexicans decides to search in the labor market
the U.S., they need to pay additional tax τ , such like an application fee for the working
permit. Therefore the value functions of unemployed Mexicans become
rUH22 = bH22 + f(θH2 )(WH22 − UH22) + f(θL2 )(WHL22 − UH22) + µ
∫ ∞
0
max{UH21 − UH22 − τ − c, 0}dF (c)
(3.33)
rUL22 = bL22 + f(θL2 )(WL22 − UL22) + µ
∫ ∞
0
max{UL21 − UL22 − τ − c, 0}dF (c). (3.34)
The tax on Mexicans reduces the surplus of migration to the United States. This
taxation discourages these Mexican workers immigrate to the United States. Therefore, the
share of Mexicans in the labor force in the United States decreases. When the share of
Mexicans decreases, the expected surplus of a match in the US decreases since Mexicans
provide higher surplus in the US. When more Mexicans stay in Mexico and the surplus of
migration decreases, the expected surplus
Proposition 13 With an increase in τ , for all κ ∈ {H,L},
i) the labor market tightness in the skilled labor market in the U.S. increases; the
labor market tightness in the unskilled labor market in the U.S. decreases;
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ii) the unemployment of the skilled labor market in the U.S. decreases; the unem-
ployment of the unskilled labor market in the U.S. increases;
iii) the wages of skilled-κ workers in the U.S. decrease;
iv) the immigrants with skill κ from Mexico to the U.S. decrease;
v) the skilled immigrants from the U.S. to Mexico increase.
The change on the worker distribution decreases the expected revenue of a match in the
United States. The labor market tightness in the unskilled labor market in the United
States decreases. However, the labor market tightness in the skilled labor market in the
United States increases. More US-born workers move out of the US to Mexico.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper studies policy examples that can control the number of immigrants. I
apply a search and matching framework to model the migration behavior with two skill-
bias labor markets and two countries. In this model, all unemployed workers encounter
with a migration opportunity with heterogenous migration cost. If the migration cost is
low enough, workers search and work in the foreign country. The model is calibrated to the
labor market data in the US and Mexico and captures the labor mobility between the US
and Mexico.
The model is able to predict effects of immigration policies. The subsidy to firms
who hire native workers in the US attracts more Mexicans to move to the US, since the US
labor markets become better. The tax to firms who hire Mexico decreases the labor mobility
between the US and Mexico, because the labor market in the US goes down. The tax to
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Mexicans who move to the US discourage Mexicans to move to US as the migration cost
goes up. The subsidy to the US-born workers search in Mexico attracts US-born workers
move to Mexico.
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Chapter 4
Immigration and overeducation in
the US
4.1 Introduction
How do immigrants affect the labor market in the US? This question have been
debated for a long time. Existing research focus on the impact of immigration on un-
employment and wages of natives. Native workers benefit from immigrants in term of
employment. However, do these native workers work for a job that match their skill? To
answer this question, this paper constructs a model based on the Pissarides labor search
and matching model. The model provides a theoretical explanation of the mismatch in the
labor market in the US. Moreover, it also predicts a quantitative measure of mismatch with
and without foreign workers.
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Since the 1970s, people realize that the unemployment rate persists on a high rate
and wage inequality become larger. These issues attract people’s attention and they try to
explain these problems. S¸ahin et al. (2014) provide three reason to explain this situation.
First, there are no enough aggregate labor demand. Second, higher unemployment benefit
keeps people being unemployed longer. The third reason is that mismatch becomes a severe
issue in U.S. labor market. When people look at the wage differential, they believe that
it happened only cross sections or skills, e.g. high school graduate and college graduate.
However, recent empirical research shows that this wage inequality not only occurs across
sections, but also occurs in the same section. People widely believe that workers obtain more
education than they need for jobs. Freeman (1976) states that Americans are overeducated
because of the falling college-high school wage differential.
Wage inequality caused by mismatch are even more severe among immigrants.
Borjas (2005) indicates that high-skill immigrants increase 10% of labor supply but reduce
3% of earning of their cohort. Beckhusen et al. (2013) give empirical evidence that immi-
grants suffer much more overeducation than native workers in United States. Aleksynska
and Tritah (2013) provide that 22% of immigrants are mismatched in Europe, compared
with 13% overeducated native workers. Because immigrants have lower outside option, they
are not only willing to accept lower wages of skilled jobs, but to accept unskilled jobs. The
other reason that immigrants have higher overeducation rate is that they are imperfect for
human capital transferability. Liu et al. (2014) mention that this imperfect transferability
of human capital is caused by lack of language skills, cultural and economic difference, and
occupational licensing requirement. Also, Nielsen (2011) points out that the human capital
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acquired in their original countries is costed less than the one acquired in the destination
countries.
In this paper, I study the impacts of immigration with mismatch and imperfect
substitution between unskilled native workers and immigrants, following search and match-
ing approach. To introducing the imperfect substitution between unskilled native workers
and immigrants, I apply the production function from Acemoglu (2001). There are two
sectors in the production section, final good and intermediate good. Unskilled workers,
either native workers or immigrants, produce intermediate good. Final good is produced
by skilled labor input and intermediate good. Both labor markets and intermediate good
market are competitive. The difference between native workers and immigrants are unem-
ployment benefit, which is lower for immigrants. In this model, skilled workers choose to
search in skilled or unskilled labor market. There are two equilibria. One equilibrium is
that there is no mismatch exists. If the population of skilled workers is too limited, the
price of skilled intermediate good is high enough such that the value of searching in the
skilled labor market is greater than searching in the unskilled labor market. The other equi-
librium is that the population of skilled workers is too large such that skilled workers are
indifferent to search in the skilled or unskilled labor market. Overeducation exists in this
equilibrium. This equilibrium is solved recursively and the equilibrium underemployment
can be measured.
When the population of skilled immigrants increases, it affects labor market out-
comes in two channels. The first channel is the price channel. According to the production
function, the price of skilled intermediate good decreases with an increase in the skilled
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labor. Skilled immigrants are only allowed to search in the skilled labor market so that
they directly increase the labor in the skilled labor market. Therefore, the price of skilled
intermediate good drops. The overeducation enlarges because of the worse labor market
outcomes in the skilled labor market. On the other hand, the expected surplus of skilled
filled jobs increases with this increase in the population of skilled immigrants. Compared
with skilled native workers, skilled immigrants have worse outside options so that they ac-
cept lower wages than natives. Since the labor cost decreases with an increase in skilled
immigrants, the expected surplus goes up and makes labor market outcomes better off.
Overeducation declines as skilled workers prefer to stay in the skilled labor market.
To see the overall effect of skilled immigration on overeducation, this paper adopts
the mismatch index from S¸ahin et al. (2014). This index measures the loss of matches by
mismatch. With this measure, I can compare the mismatch before and after the popula-
tion of skilled immigrants increases. I am going to use the vacancies data from the Help
Wanted OnLine (HWOL) dataset provided by The Conference Board (TCB) and the unem-
ployment data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to measure the mismatch index
quantitatively.
Related Literature as following. Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) study immigra-
tion impact on labor market with skill heterogeneity. They apply the Acemoglu production
function to introduce the imperfect substitution between labor and capital. Their work
shows that immigration can benefit unskilled native workers on both unemployment and
wages. Skilled native workers can only be benefited on unemployment under perfect sub-
stitution, but benefited on both of unemployment and wages under imperfect substitution.
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Ortega (2000) studies two-country immigration, i.e. workers can choose to immigrate or
not. Compared social welfare of an economy with and without immigration, he proves that
immigration is Pareto improving. The closest study is Liu et al. (2014). The differences be-
tween my paper and their work are that 1) they do not consider the imperfect substitution
between native workers and immigrants; 2) they introduce different search cost between na-
tive workers and immigrants but I differ native workers and immigrants by using different
unemployment benefit.
4.2 Social planner’s problem
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy has two sectors, the final good
sector and the intermediate good sectors. There are two types of intermediate goods, skilled
and unskilled intermediate goods. Firms in the intermediate good sectors enter the skilled or
unskilled labor markets and hire workers from them. Firms in the final good sector produce
final good by using the skilled and unskilled intermediate good, following the production
function
Y = A[αY ρH + (1− α)Y ρL ]1/ρ, (4.1)
where A is the production efficiency, α is the share of skilled intermediate good, ρ is given
by the substitution between skilled and unskilled goods. The variable YH represents the
skilled intermediate good and YL represents the unskilled intermediate good. Assume that
every employed worker can produce one unit of skilled/unskilled intermediate good, which
depends on the labor market that they are employed. The price of skilled and unskilled
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intermediate good are
pH = A[α+ (1− α)( YL
YH
)ρ]
(1−ρ)
ρ (4.2)
pL = A[α(
YH
YH
)ρ + (1− α)]
(1−ρ)
ρ (4.3)
The labor markets are frictional. The total labor force is normalized and it equals
to the sum of employed and unemployed workers in both labor markets, i.e.
∑
(eit + uit) =
1. Each unemployed workers searches in one labor market only. Workers match with
vacancies following a matching function m(vi, ui). The variable vi represents the number of
vacancies in market i and ui represents the number of unemployed workers search in market
i. The matching function m(vi, ui) is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments and
homogeneous of degree one in (vi, ui).
In each period, activities are as follows. At the beginning of every period, the
employment eit in the labor markets are given from the last period. The vacancies in each
labor market is drawn from a distribution F (vt). The social planner allocates unemployed
skilled workers into skilled and unskilled labor market without labor mobility cost. After
these skilled workers are allocated, they search in the market that they are allocated. Un-
skilled workers are only able to search in the unskilled labor market. Workers matches with
vacancies at rate f(θi), which is defined as f(θi) = m(vi, ui)/ui. The variable vi is the
number of vacancies in market i and ui is the number of unemployed workers that search
in the labor market i. The variable θi is defined as the market tightness of market i, which
is the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. When workers matches with a vacancies, they
start producing the intermediate good Yi. At the end of the period, there is a job separation
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shock at rate δi. The social planner’s problem is written as follow,
V (EHH , EHL, ELL;VH , VL) = max
UHL,UHH
F (YH , YL) + βV (E
′
HH , E
′
HL, E
′
LL;V
′
H , V
′
L) (4.4)
s.t.NL = ELL + ULL
NH = EHH + UHH + EHL + UHL
YH = EHH +m(vH , UHH)
YL = ELL + EHL +m(vL, UHL + ULL)
E′HH = (1− δH)(EHH +m(vH , UHH))
E′HL = (1− δL)(EHL + UHLm(vL, UHL + ULL)/(UHL + ULL))
E′LL = (1− δL)(ELL + ULLm(vL, UHL + ULL)/(UHL + ULL)).
To solve this maximization problem, I obtain the optimal allocation condition of the cen-
tralized economy. According to the first order condition,
m2(vH , UHH) = f(θL) + UL
∂f(θL)
∂UHL
, (4.5)
where f(θL) = m(vL, UHL + ULL)/(UHL + ULL). Assume that the matching function is
Cobb-Douglas, which is m(vi, Ui) = φiv
ϕ
i U
1−ϕ
i . The first order condition can be rewritten
as
φHθ
ϕ
H = φLθ
ϕ
L, (4.6)
where φi is the efficiency of labor market i and θi ≡ vi/Ui is the market tightness of labor
market i.
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4.3 Decentralized markets
In decentralized markets, unemployed skilled workers choose to search in either
skilled or unskilled labor market. If a skilled unemployed worker chooses to search in
unskilled labor market and matches a unskilled job, she is the one that underemployed.
All immigrants in this economy are skilled immigrants. They are not allowed
to search in the unskilled labor market, according to the working visa restriction. The
difference between immigrants and native workers is that the unemployment benefits of
immigrants are lower than the ones of native workers.
4.3.1 Workers
In period t, if a worker is employed, she earns wage wκij , which depends on her
immigration status κ, her skilled i and the labor market j that she works, where i ∈ {H,L},
j ∈ {H,L} and κ ∈ {N, I}. The variable H represents skilled worker/skilled labor market,
L represents unskilled worker/unskilled labor market, N represents natives, and I represents
immigrants. For example, if a skilled immigrant worker works in a unskilled job, her wage
is wIHL. She may lose her job at the end of the period at rate δj . Therefore, the value
function of an employed worker is
Wκij = wκij + β[(1− δj)Wκij + δjUκij ]. (4.7)
For an unemployed worker, if she is unskilled, she searches in the unskilled labor
market only. For a skilled unemployed native worker, she can choose to search in the skilled
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or unskilled labor market by comparing the value of searching, which is
UNH = max{UNHH ,UNHL}. (4.8)
Any unemployed workers receive a flow of unemployment benefits bκij in period t. During
period t, they may match a vacant job and become an employed worker at rate f(θj). Thus
the value function of skilled and unskilled workers as follow respectively,
UκHH = bκHH + β[f(θH)WκHH + (1− f(θH))UκHH ] (4.9)
UNHL = bNHL + β[f(θL)WNHL + (1− f(θL))UNHL] (4.10)
UNLL = bNLL + β[f(θL)WNLL + (1− f(θL))UNLL]. (4.11)
4.3.2 Firms
Firms enter both of markets freely. Assume that they are all small firms and each
firm has one job, either vacant or filled. If a firm holds a vacant job in a labor market j, it
pays a flow of recruitment cost kj . It may match an unemployed worker at rate q(θj). This
firm starts producing intermediate good in next period. If it do not match with a worker,
the vacancy passes to next period. Firms in the skilled labor market match skilled workers
only. Since skilled workers are able to search in both of skilled and unskilled labor market,
firms in the unskilled labor market may hire a skilled or unskilled worker, which is different
from firms in the skilled labor market. The value functions of vacant jobs in the skilled and
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unskilled labor markets are
VH = −kH + β[q(θH)J eHH + (1− q(θH))VH ] (4.12)
VL = −kL + β[q(θL)J eL + (1− q(θL))VL], (4.13)
where J eHH = (UNHH/UHH)JNHH +(U IHH/UHH)J IHH , J eL = (UHL/UL)JHL+(ULL/UL)JLL,
UL = UHL +ULL, and UHH = U
I
HH +U
N
HH . If a firm hires a worker and has a filled job, it
produces intermediate good j and sells it to a final producer in the competitive intermediate
good market. Meanwhile, the firm pays wij to the worker that it hires. At the end of the
period, this job may be destroyed at rate δj . The value functions of filled jobs in the skilled
labor market is
J κij = pj − wκij + β[(1− δj)J κij + δjVj ]. (4.14)
4.3.3 Wage determination
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining when firms and workers match.
Closely following the traditional Pissarides labor search and matching model, the wage
maximizes the surplus of a match, i.e.,
wκij = arg max(Wκij − Uκij)ξ(J κij − Vj)1−ξ (4.15)
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where ξ is the bargaining power of workers. The wage of a worker with immigration status
κ and skill i works in labor market j is
wκij =
ξ(1− β(1− δj − f(θj)))pj + (1− ξ)(1− β(1− δj))bκij
1− β(1− δj) + ξβf(θj) . (4.16)
4.3.4 Workers flows
Workers flows in this economy depends on the type of workers. For unskilled native
workers, they find jobs in the unskilled labor market at rate f(θL) if they are unemployed
or lose their jobs at rate δL if they are employed. For skilled native workers, they find jobs
in the skilled labor market at rate f(θH) if they decide to search in the skilled labor market.
Otherwise, they find jobs in the unskilled labor market at rate f(θL). If a skilled native
worker is unemployed in skilled/unskilled labor market, she loses her job at rate δH or δL.
For skilled immigrants, their flows are similar as unskilled native workers since they are
not allowed to search in the unskilled labor market. The flows are represents as following
graphs.
Figure 4.1: Flows of native workers
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Figure 4.2: Flows of immigrants
At the steady state, inflows and outflows are equal. The distribution of workers
are given by the equality of inflows and outflows. The measure of skilled native workers NH ,
unskilled native workers NL and skilled immigrants IH are exogenous. The total population
of native workers is normalized, which isNH+NL = 1. The steady state workers distribution
is solved by following equation system,
NH +NL = 1 (4.17)
UNHH + U
N
HL + E
N
HL + E
N
HH = NH (4.18)
UNLL + E
N
LL = NL (4.19)
U IHH + E
I
HH = IH (4.20)
f(θH)U
N
HH = δHE
N
HH (4.21)
f(θH)U
I
HH = δHE
I
HH (4.22)
f(θL)U
N
HL = δLE
I
HL (4.23)
f(θL)U
N
LL = δLE
N
LL. (4.24)
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Therefore, the unemployment of each type of workers are
U IHH =
IHδH
f(θH) + δH
(4.25)
UNLL =
NLδL
f(θL) + δL
(4.26)
[1 +
f(θH)
δH
]UNHH + [1 +
f(θL)
δL
]UNHL = NH . (4.27)
4.3.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be solved recursively. The wage is determined by Nash bar-
gaining in section 3.3. The workers distribution is given by the workers flows in section 3.4.
According to the free entry condition, the job creation conditions in skilled and unskilled
labor market are
kH
βq(θH)
= J eHH (4.28)
kL
βq(θL)
= J eL (4.29)
and
J eHH =
pH − weHH
β(1− δH) (4.30)
J eL =
pL − weL
β(1− δL) . (4.31)
The expected wage in the skilled labor market is
weHH = (U
N
HH/UHH)w
N
HH + (U
I
HH/UHH)w
I
HH (4.32)
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and the expected wage in the unskilled labor market is
weL = (U
N
LL/UL)w
N
LL + (U
N
HL/UL)w
I
HL. (4.33)
Definition 3 The equilibrium is defined as a sequence of variables {θj , Uκij , wκij , pj} for all
i, j ∈ {H,L} and κ ∈ {N, I} such that: θj is determined by (4.28) and (4.29); Uκij is
determined by (4.25) to (4.27); wκij is determined by (4.16); and pj is determined by (4.2)
and (4.3).
At the equilibrium, for skilled unemployed workers, the value of searching in the skilled
labor market is greater or equal the value of searching in the unskilled labor market. If
the value of searching in the skilled labor market is higher than the value of searching in
the unskilled labor market, all skilled workers stay in the skilled labor market. There is
no underemployment in this case. If the value of searching in unskilled labor market is
greater than the value of searching in the skilled labor market, all skilled workers move
to the unskilled labor market and no one is in the skilled labor market. Therefore, the
price of skilled intermediate good goes to infinite and makes the value of searching in the
skilled labor market higher than the value of searching in the unskilled labor market. When
they search in the skilled labor market, they are able to get high value of employment as
a skilled worker but they need to wait longer time for this skilled job. When these skilled
unemployed workers search in the unskilled labor market, they can get a job fast but accept
that their value of employment as an unskilled worker cannot be higher than as a skilled
worker.
Proposition 14 There is no overeducation exists if UNHH > UNHL.
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Proposition 15 There exists overeducation if and only if UNHL = UNHH .
4.4 Effects of skilled immigrants
This section discusses the effects of skilled immigrants. When the population of
skilled immigrants increases, there are more skilled intermediate good. It directly lowers
the price of skilled intermediate good pH . This is the price effect. When pH decreases, the
surplus of a skilled filled job decreases so that the skilled labor market is worse off.
Proposition 16 The price of intermediate good pH decreases with an increase in IH .
On the other hand, skilled immigrants have low value of unemployment. The expected
surplus of a skilled filled job increases with an increase in the share of skilled immigrants.
This effect is called the composition effect.
Proposition 17 The expected value of a match J eHH increases with an increases in IH .
4.5 Mismatch index: quantitative examination
To measure the overeducation, I apply the definition of mismatch index from S¸ahin
et al. (2014).
M = 1−
∑
m(vi, ui)∑
m(vi, u∗i )
(4.34)
It provides a method to look at the overall effect of skilled immigration on overeducation.
This mismatch index compares loss of the total match when overeducation exists. The
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numerator of the second term is the total number of matches in the decentralized market
and the denominator is the total number of matches in the social planner’s problem.
I am going to use the vacancies data from the Help Wanted OnLine (HWOL)
dataset provided by The Conference Board (TCB) and the unemployment data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) to measure the mismatch index quantitatively. HWOL
provides the information of vacancy posting, including the education requirement of each
vacancy since 2005. The model will be calibrated by using HWOL and CPS in 2005 for the
measure of vacancies and unemployment. Also, other parameter values will be calibrated
by using CPS in 2005.
To see the overall effect of skilled immigration on this mismatch index, I will
increase the measure of skilled immigrants, which is the same as the CPS from 2005 to 2015.
This numerical exercise is going to show how skilled immigrants congest job opportunities
from domestic workers or create jobs for all workers in the skilled labor market.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of skilled immigrants on the measure of underem-
ployment in the United States. The model is based on skilled-bias labor market with search
frictions. Compared with the optimal allocation of unemployed workers by solving the social
planner’s problem, the model provides two equilibria. If there are no enough skilled workers
in the skilled labor market, the overeducation does not exist. The overeducation exists only
when the number of skilled workers are too big and skilled workers are indifferent to search
in the skilled or unskilled labor market. This theoretical framework provides two channels
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that skilled immigrants affect the mismatch in the labor market. The price channel implies
that the price of skilled intermediate good decreases with an increase in skilled immigrants.
While the composition effect shows that the expected match surplus goes up because skilled
immigrants have worse outside options than domestic workers. Thus, the job creation goes
up and there is less mismatch.
The next step of this paper is to calibrate the model by using HWOL and CPS
in 2005. To look at the overall effect of skilled immigrants, I will increase the measure of
skilled immigrants from CPS in 2005 to 2015. With the numerical exercise, I am able to
find the overall effect of skilled immigrants on the mismatch.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
These three essays study the immigration impacts on labor market outcomes us-
ing the frictional labor market framework. Chapter 2 shows the impact of immigration on
labor market outcomes and crime is determined by a direct and an indirect channel. The
direct channel shows that skilled immigrants decrease the property crime rate while un-
skilled immigrants drive up the property crime rate directly. The indirect channel through
the frictional labor market shows that an increase in immigrants improves labor market
outcomes. Thus, unemployed workers are less likely to commit crimes.
Quantitatively, the effects on the indirect channel dominates and the crime rate
decreases with an increase in the number of immigrants. The model also runs policies
experiments. With a more generous unemployment insurance system for immigrants, the
unemployment rate and the crime rate increases, and the wages of native workers decrease.
A longer prison duration and deportation lower the crime rate by increasing the opportunity
cost of committing a crime. The former affects the criminal behavior of both native and
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immigrant workers, but the latter affects only the criminal behavior of immigrants. Thus,
the magnitude of the effect of incarceration is larger than the deportation policy.
Chapter 3 examines the migration behavior of workers. The labor-oriented immi-
grants take labor market conditions of both the home country and destination country. I
apply a search and matching framework to model the migration behavior with two skill-
bias labor markets and two countries. In this model, all unemployed workers encounter with
a migration opportunity with heterogenous migration cost and there is a double-direction
labor mobility between a developed and a developing country exists in the skilled labor mar-
ket. However, workers in the unskilled labor market only move from the developing country
to the developed country. The model is able to predict effects of immigration policies. The
model is calibrated to the labor market data in the US and Mexico and captures the labor
mobility between the US and Mexico. A subsidy to firms who hire native workers in the US
attracts more Mexicans to move to the US, since the US labor markets improve. Taxing
firms who hire Mexican workers decrease the labor mobility between the US and Mexico,
because the labor market tightness in the US goes down. A tax on Mexicans who move to
the US discourage Mexicans to move to US as the migration cost goes up. Subsiding to
US-born workers to search in Mexico attracts US-born workers to move to Mexico.
Chapter 4 studies the effects of skilled immigrants on the measure of underem-
ployment in the United States. The model is based on skilled-bias labor market with search
frictions. Skilled workers are able to search in the skilled or unskilled labor market. Overe-
ducation exists only when the number of skilled workers are too large and skilled workers
are indifferent to search in the skilled or unskilled labor market. This theoretical frame-
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work provides two channels that cause mismatch in the labor market for skilled immigrants.
The price channel implies that the price of intermediate goods produced by skilled work-
ers decreases with an increase in skilled immigrants. The cost channel shows that skilled
immigrants lower the expected labor cost. Therefore, firms are encouraged to post more
vacancies in the skilled labor market, the job creation increases and there is less mismatch.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. According to the Nash bargaining, the surplus must be maximized by
the optimal employment contract. Compared with the expected capital loss of a match,
pi(ΠjF,i + V
j
E,i − V jP,i), and the employees’ opportunity cost of committing a crime, pi(V jE,i −
V jP,i), the surplus is maximized iff when Π
j
F,i = 0. According to equation (2.3), the value of
a filled job is
ΠjF,i =
yi − wji
r + δ + piµ(1− F (g¯jE,i))
.
Therefore, ΠjF,i = 0 requires
wji = yi.
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Solve equation (2.9),
φji = (1− β)(V jE,i − V jU,i).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. According to equation (2.13), take the first order derivatives of φe,
∂φei
∂θi
= (1− β)
∑
j
[
∂(U ji /Ui)
∂θi
(V jE,i − V jU,i) +
U ji
Ui
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
]
= (1− β)
∑
j
[
Ui(∂U
j
i /∂θi)− U ji (∂Ui/∂θi)
U2i
(V jE,i − V jU,i)
+
U ji
Ui
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
].
According to a set of reasonable parameter value,
Ui(∂U
j
i /∂θi)− U ji (∂Ui/∂θi)
U2i
→ 0.
Therefore,
∂φei
∂θi
→ (1− β)
∑
j
U ji
Ui
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
.
101
The first order partial derivatives of (V jE,i − V jU,i) is
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
= −(V jE,i − V jU,i)
β[∂(θiq(θi))/∂θi]
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
< 0
as ∂(θiq(θi))/∂θi > 0. Thus, ∂φ
e
i/∂θi < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. At θi = 0,
ki
q(θi)
= 0.
If
φei = (1− β)E
yi −Bi − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
(1− F (g))dg
r + δi
> 0,
at θi = 0, ki/q(θi) < φ
e
i . According to lemma 2 and ∂[ki/q(θi)]/∂θi > 0, there exists an
unique θi that ki/q(θi) = φ
e
i and θi > 0.
Since yi > B
j
i for all i ∈ {H,L} and j ∈ {N, I}, V jE,i − V jU,i > 0. According to
(2.8),
g¯jE,i − g¯jU,i = pi(V jE,i − V jU,i)
> 0.
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Thus, g¯jE,i > g¯
j
U,i at any equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. (i)According to equation (2.8),
g¯IE,i − g¯NE,i = pi(V IE,i − V NP,i − V NE,i + V NP,i)
≈ pi( δi
r + δi
− ρ
r + ρ
)(V IU,i − V NU,i).
Since BIi < B
N
i , V
I
U,i < V
N
U,i. Therefore, g¯
I
E,i > g¯
N
E,i if δi < ρ.
(ii) Similarly as (i),
g¯IU,i − g¯NU,i = pi(V IU,i − V NP,i − V NU,i + V NP,i)
= pi
r
r + ρ
(V IU,i − V NU,i) < 0
as V IU,i < V
N
U,i. Therefore, g¯
I
U,i < g¯
N
U,i.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. According to equation 2.8,
g¯jE,H − g¯jE,L = pi(V jE,H − V jP,H − V jE,L + V jP,L)
=
pi
r + ρ
[rV jE,H − rV jE,L + ρ(V jE,H − V jU,H − V jE,L + V jU,L)].
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Skilled workers provide high productivity. Thus, V jE,H > V
j
E,L and V
j
E,H − V jU,H > V jE,L −
V jU,L. As a result, g¯
j
E,H > g¯
j
E,L. Similarly,
g¯jU,H − g¯jU,L = pi(V jU,H − V jP,H − V jU,L + V jP,L)
= pi
r
r + ρ
(V jU,H − V jU,L).
Because BjH > B
j
L, V
j
U,H > V
j
U,L. Thus, g¯
j
U,H > g¯
j
U,L. In conclusion, g¯
j
s,H > g¯
j
s,L for all
s ∈ E,U and j ∈ I,N .
Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
Proof. According to equation (2.8), the reservation value of employed and unem-
ployed workers are
g¯jE,i = pi(V
j
E,i − V jP,i)
g¯jU,i = pi(V
j
U,i − V jP,i).
Since yH > yL and B
N > BI , it is obvious that employed skilled immigrants have highest
reservation crime value and unemployed unskilled immigrants are the most likely commit
crimes. It is straightforward to show that the overall crime rate decreases with skilled
immigrants and increases with unskilled immigrants.
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Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Equation (2.12) gives the hiring fee of type-ij workers. It is obvious that
φIi − φNi =
1− β
r + δ + βθq(θ)
(BNi −BIi + µ
∫ g¯NE,i
g¯NU,i
(1− F (g))dg + µ
∫ g¯IU,i
g¯IE,i
(1− F (g))dg)
> 0
as BNi > B
I
i and µ(
∫ g¯NE,i
g¯NU,i
(1−F (g))dg+∫ g¯IU,i
g¯IE,i
(1−F (g))dg) is quantitatively small. Therefore,
φIi > φ
N
i .
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The partial derivatives of the fraction of unemployed immigrants with
respect to IH and IL are
∂(U IH/UH)
∂IH
=
∂(U IH/UH)
∂U IH
∂U IH
∂IH
and
∂(U IL/UL)
∂IL
=
∂(U IL/UL)
∂U IL
∂U IL
∂IL
.
Take the first order derivatives of (2.21) and (2.23) with respect to IH and IL respectively,
then
∂U IH
∂IH
=
ρ(δH + η
I
E,H)
θHq(θH)(ρ+ ηIE,H) + (δH + η
I
E,H)(ρ+ η
I
U,H)
> 0,
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and
∂U IL
∂IL
=
ρ(δL + η
I
E,L)
θLq(θL)(ρ+ ηIE,L) + (δL + η
I
E,L)(ρ+ η
I
U,L)
> 0.
Since Ui =
∑
j U
j
i ,
∂(U IH/UH)
∂U IH
=
UH − U IH
U2H
> 0
and
∂(U IL/UL)
∂U IL
=
UL − U IL
U2L
> 0.
Therefore, ∂(U IH/UH)/∂IH > 0 and ∂(U
I
L/UL)/∂IL > 0. When IH or IL increases, the
fraction of unemployed skilled or unskilled immigrants increases.
According to lemma 5, the hiring fee of immigrants is higher than native workers,
conditional on their skills. When the fraction of unemployed immigrants increases, the
expected hiring fee increases.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. According to the proof of lemma 5 and 6, Proposition 4 is proved.
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Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. According to equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.8), the reservation crime value
of employed and unemployed workers can be written as
g¯jE,i =
pi
r + ρ
(yi + (ρ− δi)(V jE,i − V jU,i) + µ
∫ gm
g¯jE,i
1− F (g)dg − x). (A.1)
and
g¯jU,i =
pi
r + ρ
(Bji + θiq(θi)(V
j
E,i − V jU,i) + µ
∫ gm
g¯jU,i
1− F (g)dg − x). (A.2)
Take the first order derivatives of g¯jE,i and g¯
j
U,i with respect to θi,
(1 +
piµ
r + ρ
(1− F (g¯jE,i)))
∂g¯jE,i
∂θi
=
pi(ρ− δi)
r + ρ
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
and
(1 +
piµ
r + ρ
(1− F (g¯jU,i)))
∂g¯jU,i
∂θi
=
pi
r + ρ
∂(θiq(θi)(V
j
E,i − V jU,i))
∂θi
.
The sign of ∂g¯jE,i/∂θi is same as ∂(V
j
E,i − V jU,i)/∂θi if ρ > δi. According to equation (2.4)
and (2.5) the employment premium is
V jE,i − V jU,i =
yi −Bj − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
(1− F (g))dg
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
. (A.3)
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Then
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
= −β
yi −Bj − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
(1− F (g))dg
(r + δi + βθiq(θi))2
∂θiq(θi)
∂θi
< 0.
Thus, ∂g¯jE,i/∂θi < 0 if ρ < δi.
When it turns to ∂g¯jU,i/∂θi, its sign depends on ∂(θiq(θi)(V
j
E,i − V jU,i))/∂θi. Then
∂(θiq(θi)(V
j
E,i − V jU,i))
∂θi
= (V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θiq(θi)
∂θi
+ θiq(θi)
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂θi
=
∂θiq(θi)
∂θi
[V jE,i − V jU,i −
βθiq(θi)
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
(V jE,i − V jU,i)]
=
r + δi
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
∂θiq(θi)
∂θi
(V jE,i − V jU,i)
> 0
Therefore, ∂g¯jU,i/∂θi > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When the unemployment utility flow of immigrants increases to that of
native workers, their match surplus decreases to that of natives. Therefore, the expected
hiring fee, which is proportion (1−β) to the match surplus, decreases. According to (2.13),
market tightness decreases to balance the equilibrium.
According to equation (2.5), ∂V jU,i/∂B
j
i > 0. When the unemployment utility flow
of skilled-i immigrants BIi increases, the reservation crime value of unemployed immigrant
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with skill i is following
g¯iU,i = pi(V
I
U,i − V IP,i)
=
pi
r + ρ
(rV jU,i − x+ τ)
increases as V IU,i increases with B
I
i . Therefore, ∂g¯
I
U,i/∂B
I
i > 0. For employed immigrant
with skill i, according to (A.3), the match surplus of skilled-i immigrant decreases with BIi .
Therefore, g¯IE,i decreases with B
I
i if ρ > δi given (A.1).
The reservation crime value of native workers is only affected by the market tight-
ness. Based on lemma 5,
∂g¯NE,i
∂BIi
=
∂g¯NE,i
∂θi
∂θi
∂BIi
> 0
if ρ > δi and
∂g¯NU,i
∂BIi
=
∂g¯NU,i
∂θi
∂θi
∂BIi
< 0.
Similarly, the reservation crime value of immigrants with skill i′, where i′ 6= i, is also affected
by θi. Therefore,
∂g¯IE,i′
∂BIi
=
∂g¯NE,i′
∂θi
∂θi
∂BIi
> 0
if ρ > δi and
∂g¯IU,i′
∂BIi
=
∂g¯IU,i′
∂θi
∂θi
∂BIi
< 0.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. According to (2.13),
1
dρ
(d
ki
q(θi)
) =
1
dρ
d[(1− β)
∑
j
U ji
Ui
(V jE,i − V jU,i)]
which can be written as
∂( kiq(θi))
∂θi
∂θi
∂ρ
= (1− β)
∑
j
[(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂(U ji /Ui)
∂ρ
+
U ji
Ui
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂ρ
].
For composition effect,
∂(U ji /Ui)/∂ρ =
1
U2i
[Ui
∂U ji
∂ρ
− U ji
∂Ui
∂ρ
].
The composition effect is ambiguous analytically. According to the set of parameter value
that is applied in this paper, this effect is close to zero.
For match surplus,
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂ρ
=
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂g¯jE,i
∂g¯jE,i
∂ρ
+
∂(V jE,i − V jU,i)
∂g¯jU,i
∂g¯jU,i
∂ρ
= −µ[(1− F (g¯jE,i))
∂g¯jE,i
∂ρ
− (1− F (g¯jU,i))
∂g¯jU,i
∂ρ
]
According to equations (A.1) and (A.2), g¯jE,i > g¯
j
U,i and | ∂g¯jE,i/∂ρ |<| ∂g¯jU,i/∂ρ |. Therefore,
∂(V jE,i−V jU,i)/∂ρ > 0. As a consequence, the effect of incarceration on the market tightness
is positive.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Take first order derivatives of the match surplus of immigrants with respect
to a,
∂(V IE,i − V IU,i)
∂a
=
−µ
r + δ + βθq(θ)
((1− F (g¯IE,i))
∂g¯IE,i
∂a
− (1− F (g¯IU,i))
∂g¯IU,i
∂a
)
According to (2.26),
∂g¯IE,i
∂a
=
∂g¯IU,i
∂a
= −V IP,i
= −x+ ρV
I
U,i
r + ρ
< 0.
Thus,
∂(V IE,i − V IU,i)
∂a
=
−µ
r + δi + βθiq(θi)
(F (g¯IU,i)− F (g¯IE,i))
∂g¯IE,i
∂a
< 0.
Comparing the unemployment of immigrants before and after the deportation pol-
icy, the reservation crime value increases, the unemployment of immigrants with deportation
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decreases, which is
∆U Ii =
(δi + η˜
I
E,i)Ii
θiq(θi) + η˜IE,i + δi
− ρ(δi + η
I
E,i)Ii
θiq(θi)(ρ+ ηIE,i) + (δi + η
I
E,i)(ρ+ η
I
U,i)
< 0,
where η˜IE,i represents the rate of getting arrested with deportation. Therefore the share of
unemployed immigrants decreases and the market tightness is ambiguous. Quantitatively,
the effect on the market tightness decreases by a small margin with a. The effects on g¯NE,i
and g¯NU,i follows Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. When Ii increases, employment in the skilled-i labor market increases,
i.e.,
dEi
dIi
> 0.
The intermediate good in skill i increases as there is more employment in market i. Ac-
cording to equation (29) and (30), and Ei = Yi ,
dpi
dEi
< 0,
dpi′
dEi
> 0.
112
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Given a certain θi, when Ii increases, the price of good i decreases and
the price of good i′ increases. According to the value functions of workers,
∂V jE,i
∂pi
= 1,
∂V jU,i
∂pi
= θiq(θi)∂V
j
E,i/∂pi
> 0.
When pi decreases, the reservation crime value of workers with skill i decreases.
Similarly, the reservation crime value of workers with skill i′ increases.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. (i) When Ii increases, the cost of a match decreases because of the low
outside options value from immigrants. At the same time, according to lemma (8), pi
decreases. The tightness in market i only increases when the match revenue increases.
Therefore, when the cost effect dominates the price effect, θi increases.
(ii) According to lemma (8), pi′ increases with an increase in Ii. It is simple to
prove that θi′ increases with an increase in Ii.
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A.2 The Model without a hiring fee
This section shows the model without a hiring fee. The value functions of unem-
ployed workers and vacancies are
rV jU,i = B
j
i − τ + θq(θ)(V jE,i − V jU,i) + µ
∫ gm
0
max{KjU,i − V jU,i, 0}dF (g) (A.4)
rΠV = −k + q(θ)(ΠeF −ΠV ). (A.5)
The value functions of employed workers and filled jobs are the same as the model with
hiring fee. The free entry condition is still satisfied, i.e. ΠV = 0. Following Pissarides
(2000) closely, the wage are determined by the Nash bargaining share rule as
(1− β)(V jE,i − V jU,i) = βΠjF,i. (A.6)
From (2.3), the value of filled job can be written as
ΠjF,i =
yi − wji
r + δ + µpi(1− F (g¯jE,i))
. (A.7)
Given (2.4) and (A.4), the premium of employment is
V jE,i − V jU,i =
wji −Bji − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
1− F (g)dg
r + δ + θq(θ)
. (A.8)
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Substitute (A.7) and (A.8) into (A.6), and rewrite it as
(1− β)
wji −Bji − µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
1− F (g)dg
r + δ + θq(θ)
= β
yi − wji
r + δ + µpi(1− F (g¯jE,i))
. (A.9)
Therefore, the wage is
wji =
β(r + δ + θq(θ))yi + (1− β)(r + δ + µpi(1− F (g¯jE,i)))(Bji + µ
∫ g¯jE,i
g¯jU,i
1− F (g)dg)
r + δ + βθq(θ) + (1− β)µpi(1− F (g¯jE,i))
.
(A.10)
Similar to the model with the hiring fee, the free entry condition gives
k
q(θ)
= ΠeF , (A.11)
where ΠeJ =
∑
i
∑
j(U
j
i /U)Π
j
J,i. Equation (A.11) gives the condition of equilibrium.
Table A.8 presents the simulation results with this model. The main difference
between these two situations is the reservation crime value of employees, g¯jE,i. In the case
of a hiring fee, employees earn all the productivity and the match surplus is higher than the
case with standard Nash bargaining. Therefore, the g¯jE,i is higher than with standard Nash
bargaining. With standard Nash bargaining, the reservation crime value of skilled employed
immigrants, g¯IE,H , is still high among all types of workers, but is lower than that of skilled
native employed workers, g¯NE,H . Hence, when the population of skilled immigrants increases,
the overall crime rate decreases but the decrease is quantitatively smaller than with an
employment contract. The reservation crime value of unskilled employed immigrants, g¯IE,L,
is lower than the unskilled native workers, g¯NE,L, with standard Nash bargaining. Hence,
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when the population of unskilled immigrants increases, the overall crime rate decreases more
than with the employment contract. Overall, when both groups of immigrants increase, the
overall crime rate decreases at a smaller margin than the one with the employment contract.
A.3 A simpler model with one skill
A simpler model with one skill only is presented in this section. To see the com-
position and labor market effects of immigration on labor market outcomes and crimes,
this model only has immigrant and native workers with the same skill level. Table A.9
shows the simulation results with this model. In this model, an increase in the population
of immigrants decreases the overall unemployment rate by 0.4497 percentage points and
decreases the overall crime rate by 0.17 per 1,000 in the population.
A.4 A model with random search
The main model assumes there are two segmented labor markets, skilled and un-
skilled. In this section, I relax this assumption because skilled workers can work in the
unskilled labor market as well. Workers search in the same labor market. Firms post iden-
tical vacancies in the labor market. Other model setups are the same as the main model.
Table A.10 represents the simulation results for this model. In this case, the market tight-
ness increases by 0.1586. The overall unemployment rate decreases by 0.4665 percentage
points. The overall crime rate decreases by 0.164 per 1,000 in the population.
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Tables
Table A.1: Calibration results
description sources/target
yH 1.0 Normalized skilled productivity
yL 0.62 Relative unskilled productivity The college-plus wage premium: 61.1%
β 0.5 Bargaining power Hosios (1990a)
α 0.5 Elasticity of matching function Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Estimated from data:
r 0.048 real interest rate Fed. of Saint Louis
δH 0.228 Annual job separation rate Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
in the skilled labor market
δL 0.408 Annual job separation rate Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
in the unskilled labor market
ρ 0.75 Rate of exit from jail Engelhardt et al. (2008)
pi 0.019 Apprehension probability Engelhardt et al. (2008)
IH 0.036 Mass of skilled immigrants Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
IL 0.089 Mass of unskilled immigrants
τ 0.0391 Expected loss of victims equal to ge
γ 0.274 Fraction of skilled native workers Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
to total natives workers
Jointly calibrated to match:
A 6.7455 Match technology Employment rate
kh 0.4260 Fixed recruitment cost in the skilled market: 0.976
in the skilled labor market Employment rate
kl 0.5283 Fixed recruitment cost in the unskilled market: 0.939
in the unskilled labor market The skilled native-immigrant
BH,N 0.3932 Unemployed. flow value, skilled natives wage gap: -19%
BL,N 0.2383 Unemploy. flow value, unskilled natives The unskilled native-immigrant
BH,I -1.7263 Unemploy. flow value, skilled immigrant wage gap: -18.8%
BL,I -1.0703 Unemploy. flow value, unskilled immigrant θ normalized to 1
µ 0.0704 Arrival rate of criminal opportunity The overall crime rate: 0.0451
Ratio of unemployed
and employed income: 40%
The college-plus wage premium: 61.1%
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Table A.2: Effect of immigration
increase in IH and IL increase in IH Increase in IL
θH 0.3291 0.3291 No effect
θL 0.1214 No effect 0.1214
u -0.3288 -0.1137 -0.2248
c -0.156 -0.226 0.061
skilled natives
uNH -0.1818 -0.1818
w˜NH 0.13 0.13 No effect
cNE,H 0.109 0.109
cNU,H -0.061 -0.061
unskilled natives
uNL -0.3655 -0.3655
w˜NL 0.23 No effect 0.23
cNE,L 0.059 0.059
cNU,L -0.084 -0.084
skilled immigrants
cIE,H 0.429 0.429 No effect
cIU,H -0.295 -0.295
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L 0.245 No effect 0.245
cIU,L -0.409 -0.409
Note: 1. Skilled immigrants increase by 0.026. Unskilled immigrants increase by 0.051 for
the simulation, which are normalized to the size of native population.
2. The variable θi is the market tightness, c is the overall crime rate, u is the overall
unemployment rate, w˜ji is the implied wage of type-ij workers, u
j
i is unemployment rate of
type-ij workers, and cjs,i is the crime rate of type-ij workers under s labor market status.
The subscript U represents unemployed, E is employed, L is unskilled, and H is skilled.
The superscript N represents native and I represents immigrant. The unemployment rates
are defined as the number of unemployed workers over the population of type-ij of workers,
presented as percentage. The crime rates represents the number of criminal offenses per
1000 population of type-ij of workers.
3. The table presents the changes with the increase in the immigrants. The changes in the
market tightness are changes in level. The changes in the unemployment rates are changes
in percentage points. The changes in the wages are percentage changes. The changes in
crime rates are changes in level.
118
Table A.3: Crime rate of workers
Type of worker crime rate Type of worker crime rate
Skilled employed natives 37.665 Skilled employed immigrants 32.843
Skilled unemployed natives 39.995 Skilled unemployed immigrants 43.007
Unskilled employed natives 48.281 Unskilled employed immigrants 44.762
Unskilled unemployed natives 50.836 Unskilled unemployed immigrants 56.244
Note: This table shows the crime rate of each type of workers, which is the number that
criminal offenses per 1000 population of the type-ij of workers.
Table A.4: Effects of increasing unemployment benefits
BIH = B
N
H
BIL = B
N
L B
I
H = B
N
H B
I
L = B
N
L
θH -0.558 -0.558 no effects
θL -0.2507 no effects -0.2507
u 0.8886 0.1237 0.7651
c 0.235 0.082 0.154
skilled natives
uNH 0.4484 0.4484
wNH -0.3103 -0.3103 no effects
cNE,H -0.264 -0.264
cNU,H 0.149 0.149
unskilled natives
uNL 1.056 1.056
wNL -0.6462 no effects -0.6462
cNE,L -0.169 -0.169
cNU,L 0.238 0.238
skilled immigrants
cIE,H 4.558 4.558 no effects
cIU,H -2.863 -2.863
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L 3.35 no effects 3.35
cIU,L -5.17 -5.17
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Table A.5: Effects of increasing duration of incarceration
32 months 48 months
θH 0.0002 0.0003
θL 0.0001 0.0001
u 0.0035 -0.0058
c -12.461 -20.475
skilled natives
uNH -0.0030 -0.0047
wNH 0.0020 -0.0057
cNE,H -14.83 -23.054
cNU,H -15.748 -24.48
unskilled natives
uNL -0.0035 -0.0057
wNL 0.0001 0.0034
cNE,L -12.08 -20.278
cNU,L -12.719 -21.351
skilled immigrants
cIE,H -11.611 -18.456
cIU,H -15.205 -24.168
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L -8.059 -14.012
cIU,L -10.126 -17.606
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
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Table A.6: Effects of deportation
a
0.1 0.5 0.9
θH -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0007
θL -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.00005
u -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001
c -4.481 -3.973 -1.606
skilled natives
uNH 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004
wNH -0.001 -0.001 0.001
cNE,H -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002
cNU,H 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001
unskilled natives
uNL 0.0009 0.0002 0.0002
wNL -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001
cNE,L -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00003
cNU,L 0.0002 0.0002 0.00004
skilled immigrants
cIE,H -32.8114 -32.1395 -17.618
cIU,H -42.9633 -42.0834 -23.067
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L -42.4885 -36.4443 -12.882
cIU,L -53.906 -46.237 -16.343
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
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Table A.7: Extension 1: imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor
increase in IH and IL increase in IH Increase in IL
θH 0.3552 0.3218 0.0009
θL 0.1570 0.0334 0.1562
u -0.397 -0.1261 -0.2840
c -0.139 -0.193 0.053
skilled natives
uNH -0.2629 -0.2414 -0.0285
wNH 2.089 0.035 2.056
cNE,H -0.231 0.13 -0.36
cNU,H -0.37 -0.035 -0.335
unskilled natives
uNL -0.4308 -0.0027 -0.4288
wNL -0.834 0.085 -0.916
cNE,L 0.183 -0.01 0.192
cNU,L 0.057 -0.009 0.065
skilled immigrants
cIE,H 0.261 0.54 -0.263
cIU,H -0.713 -0.329 -0.395
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L 0.381 -0.008 0.389
cIU,L -0.275 -0.012 -0.264
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
122
Table A.8: Effects of immigration (Nash bargaining)
increase in IH and IL increase in IH Increase in IL
θH 0.326 0.326 No effect
θL 0.1171 No effect 0.1171
u -0.3489 -0.118 -0.240
c -0.102 -0.223 0.113
skilled natives
uNH -0.1876 -0.1876
wNH 0.13 0.13 No effect
cNE,H 0.077 0.077
cNU,H -0.091 -0.091
unskilled natives
uNL -0.3901 -0.3901
wNL 0.24 No effect 0.24
cNE,L 0.013 0.013
cNU,L -0.124 -0.124
skilled immigrants
cIE,H 0.314 0.314 No effect
cIU,H -0.456 -0.456
unskilled immigrants
cIE,L 0.057 no effect 0.057
cIU,L -0.633 -0.633
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
Table A.9: Effects of immigration: one-skilled market
increase in I
θ 0.1522
u -0.4497
c -0.17
Natives
uN -0.4496
wN 0.28%
cNE 0.109
cNU -0.16
Immigrants
cIE 0.421
cIU -0.841
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
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Table A.10: Effects of Immigration: random search
increase in IH and IL increase in IH Increase in IL
θ 0.1586 0.0825 0.0825
u -0.4665 -0.2548 -0.2510
c -0.1640 -0.2130 0.0400
Skilled natives
uH,N -0.4700 -0.2500 -0.2500
w˜H,N 0.29 0.16 0.15
cNE,H 0.0940 0.0510 0.0500
cNU,H -0.1370 -0.0740 -0.0730
Unskilled Natives
uL,N Same as skilled natives
w˜L,N 1.51 0.82 0.81
cNE,L 0.0750 0.0410 0.0400
cNU,L -0.1050 -0.0570 -0.0560
Skilled Immigrants
cIE,H 0.3610 0.1970 0.1940
cIU,H -0.7190 -0.3930 -0.3870
Unskilled immigrants
cIE,L 0.3030 0.1640 0.1620
cIU,L -0.5180 -0.2830 -0.2790
Note: See the footnotes 2 and 3 in table A.2 for the definitions of variables and the expla-
nation of rates.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Solution of the steady state equilibrium
According to (3.1) to (3.9), the workers surplus are following,
WHii − UHii =
wHii − bHii − f(θLi )(WHLii − UHii )−
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc
r + sH + f(θHi )
(B.1)
WHLii − UHii =
wHLii − bHii − f(θHi )(WHii − UHii )−
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc
r + sL + f(θLi )
(B.2)
WLii − ULii =
wLii − bLii −
∫ c¯Li
0 F (c)dc
r + sL + f(θLi )
(B.3)
WHji − UHji =
wHji − bHji
r + sH + d+ f(θHi )
(B.4)
WLji − ULji =
wLji − bLji
r + sL + d+ f(θLi )
. (B.5)
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According to (3.10) to (3.16) and the free entry condition, the firms surplus are following,
JHii − VHi =
yHii − wHii
r + sH
(B.6)
JHLii − VLi =
yHLii − wHLii
r + sL
(B.7)
J Lii − VLi =
yLii − wLii
r + sL
(B.8)
JHji − VHi =
yHji − wHji
r + sH
(B.9)
J Lji − VLi =
yLji − wLji
r + sL
. (B.10)
Following the share rule of Nash Bargaining, the wages are solved, which are
wHii = βy
H
ii + (1− β)
bHii + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc+ βf(θ
H
i )y
H
ii /(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )y
HL
ii /(r + s
L)
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )/(r + s
L)
(B.11)
wHLii = βy
HL
ii + (1− β)
bHii + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc+ βf(θ
H
i )y
H
ii /(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )y
HL
ii /(r + s
L)
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )/(r + s
L)
(B.12)
wLii =
β(r + sL + f(θLi ))y
L
ii + (1− β)(r + sL)(bLii + µi
∫ c¯Li
0 F (c)dc)
MLi
(B.13)
wHji =
β(r + sH + f(θHi ))y
H
ji + (1− β)(r + sH)bHji
MHi + d
(B.14)
wLji =
β(r + sL + f(θLi ))y
L
ji + (1− β)(r + sL)bLji
MLi + d
, (B.15)
where Mκi = r + s
κ + βf(θκi ) for all κ ∈ {H,L} and i ∈ {1, 2}. The first digit of the
subscript represents the country that the worker was born and the second digit represents
the location of her job. Per the value of unemployment in the foreign country and in the
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country of origin, the reservation migration cost of a worker who was born in country i with
skill κ is solved as
(r + d)c¯Hi = max{
βf(θHj )y
H
ij + (r + s
H + d)bHij
r + sH + d+ βf(θHj )
(B.16)
− b
H
ii + βf(θ
H
i )y
H
ii /(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )y
HL
ii /(r + s
L) + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )/(r + s
L)
, 0} (B.17)
(r + d)c¯Li = max{
βf(θLj )y
L
ij + (r + s
L + d)bLij
r + sL + d+ βf(θLj )
(B.18)
− βf(θ
L
i )y
L
ii + (r + s
L)(bLii + µi
∫ c¯Li
0 F (c)dc)
r + sL + βf(θLi )
, 0}. (B.19)
The unemployment of each type of workers are solved with (3.23) to (3.28), which are
UHii =
sLHi
f(θLi ) + s
L + sLf(θHi )/s
H + sLµiF (c¯Hi )/d
(B.20)
UHji =
sHµjF (c¯
H
j )U
H
jj
d[f(θHi ) + s
H + d]
(B.21)
ULii =
sL(Ni −Hi)
sL + f(θLi ) + µiF (c¯
L
i )/d
(B.22)
ULji =
(d+ sL)µjF (c¯
L
j )U
L
jj
d[sL + d+ f(θLi )]
. (B.23)
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B.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Propersition 1
Proof. According to (B.2) and (B.12), the surplus of mismatched skilled workers
in country i is rewritten as
WHLii − UHii =
β[yHLii + (βf(θ
H
i )/(r + s
H))(yHLii − yHii )− bHii − µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc]
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )/(r + s
L)
. (B.24)
If this surplus is negative, no skilled worker searches in the unskilled labor market. They
prefer to stay unemployed and search in the skilled labor market only. Therefore, the
productivity of skilled workers who work in the unskilled labor market should be high enough
to ensure that the surplus of skilled workers in unskilled labor market is non-negative. Per
equation (B.24), the productivity of skilled workers in the unskilled labor market satisfied
r + sH + βf(θHi )
r + sH
yHLii ≥
βf(θHi )
r + sH
yHii + b
H
ii + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0
F (c)dc.
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Proof of Propersition 2
Proof. According to (B.17) and (B.19), it is obvious that c¯H2 and c¯
L
2 are positive,
and c¯L1 = 0. The reservation cost of skilled workers in country 1 is positive if and only if
βf(θHj )y
H
ij + (r + s
H + d)bHij
r + sH + d+ βf(θHj )
>
bHii + βf(θ
H
i )y
H
ii /(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )y
HL
ii /(r + s
L) + µi
∫ c¯Hi
0 F (c)dc
1 + βf(θHi )/(r + s
H) + βf(θLi )/(r + s
L)
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B.3 Tables and graphs
Table B.1: Calibration results
description sources/target
yH11 1 Normalized skilled productivity in the US
yL11 0.4699 Relative unskilled productivity in the US The college-plus wage premium: 1.1281
yHL11 0.7143 Mismatch productivity in the US Wage gap between college workers
work in professional and in unprofessional jobs:1.4
yH22 0.6944 skilled productivity in Mexico TFP gap between US and Mexico: 1.44
yL22 0.1968 relative unskilled productivity in Mexico college-plus wage permium in Mexico: 2.53
yHL22 0.1736 Mismatch productivity in Mexico Wage gap between college workers
work in professional and in unprofessional jobs: 5.6
yH12 0.9561 skilled productivity of US-born in Mexico Wage gap between skilled US-born and Mexicans: 0.3767
β 0.5 Bargaining power Hosios (1990)
α 0.5 Elasticity of matching function Pretongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Estimated from data:
r 0.0040 real interest rate Fed. of Saint Louis
sH 0.0240 job separation rate in skilled labor market Chassamboulli and Peri (2015b)
sL 0.0320 job separation rate in unskilled labor market
d 0.0023 return rate of immigrants
N2 1/3 measure of population in Mexico
H1 0.3144 measure of skilled workers in US
H2 0.0265 measure of skilled workers in Mexico
Jointly calibrated to match:
A 0.3501 Match technology Employment rate of skilled labor market in US: 0.9520
kH 0.4349 Fixed recruitment cost in skilled labor market Employment rate of unskilled labor market in US: 0.8743
kL 0.0371 Fixed recruitment cost in unskilled labor market Employment rate of skilled labor market in Mexico: 0.9671
bH11 0.6760 Unemployed. flow value, skilled natives Employment rate of unskilled labor market in Mexico: 0.9553
bL11 0.3207 Unemploy. flow value, unskilled natives Measure of skilled US-born workers in Mexico: 0.0030
bH21 0.6979 Measure of skilled Mexicans in US: 0.0096
bL21 0.2264 Measure of unskilled Mexicans in US: 0.0638
bH22 0.2511 Unemploy. flow value, skilled immigrant ratio of employed income to unemployed income in US: 0.71
bL22 0.0779 Unemploy. flow value, unskilled immigrant ratio of employed income to unemployed income in Mexico: 0.4
bH12 0.3732 Labor market tightness: 0.62
bL12 0.1672
µ1/c
max 1.4× e−4 Arrival rate of migration opportunity in US
µ2/c
max 2.86× e−4 Arrival rate of migration opportunity in Mexico
Note: Subscripts represent countries. The first digit of the subscript represents the country
that the worker was born. The second digit of subscripts represents the location of the job.
The superscript represents the skill of the market/workers.
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Table B.2: Policy: subsidy of firms in the US
sub 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
θH1 22.91% 51.91% 88.46% 133%
θL1 60.50% 166.91% 359.31% 708%
θH2 -3.22% -6.42% -9.33% -12%
θL2 -5.11% -9.98% -14.44% -18%
wH11 -0.28% -0.65% -1.10% -2%
wL11 0.60% 1.15% 1.64% 2%
wH22 0.08% 0.16% 0.24% 0%
wL22 0.06% 0.13% 0.19% 0%
uH11 -12.97% -25.17% -36.49% -47%
uL11 -19.26% -36.16% -50.54% -62%
uH22 -0.51% -0.95% -1.27% -1%
uL22 -3.43% -6.36% -8.78% -11%
h12 9.02% 18.63% 27.46% 34%
h21 0.75% 1.48% 2.13% 3%
l12 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0%
l21 0.98% 1.84% 2.57% 3%
Table B.3: Policy: Tax to firms in the US
Tax 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
θH1 -0.1649% -0.3294% -0.4933% -0.6569%
θL1 -0.5051% -1.0072% -1.5063% -2.0024%
θH2 0.0509% 0.1019% 0.1529% 0.2039%
θL2 0.0575% 0.1150% 0.1725% 0.2300%
wH11 0.0038% 0.0076% 0.0114% 0.0151%
wL11 -0.0069% -0.0139% -0.0208% -0.0277%
wH22 -0.0001% -0.0003% -0.0004% -0.0005%
wL22 -0.0007% -0.0014% -0.0021% -0.0028%
uH11 0.1276% 0.2552% 0.3828% 0.5104%
uL11 0.2266% 0.4533% 0.6804% 0.9076%
uH22 0.0109% 0.0218% 0.0328% 0.0437%
uL22 0.0410% 0.0821% 0.1232% 0.1644%
h12 -0.2041% -0.4082% -0.6124% -0.8167%
h21 -0.0129% -0.0259% -0.0389% -0.0518%
l12 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
l21 -0.0115% -0.0230% -0.0345% -0.0461%
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Table B.4: Tax on Mexicans
tax on mexican 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.4
θH1 -0.0463% -0.0463% -0.0463% -0.0463% 0.1264%
θL1 -0.7860% -0.7860% -0.7860% -0.7860% -0.3694%
θH2 28.9478% 28.9478% 28.9478% 28.9478% 28.9355%
θL2 55.1542% 55.1542% 55.1542% 55.1542% 55.4663%
wH11 0.0103% 0.0103% 0.0103% 0.0103% 0.0078%
wL11 -0.0108% -0.0108% -0.0108% -0.0108% -0.0051%
wH22 -0.8799% -0.8799% -0.8799% -0.8799% -0.8906%
wL22 -0.6091% -0.6091% -0.6091% -0.6091% -0.6063%
uH11 0.0503% 0.0503% 0.0503% 0.0503% -0.0672%
uL11 0.3532% 0.3532% 0.3532% 0.3532% 0.1655%
uH22 231.97% 231.97% 231.97% 231.97% 231.99%
uL22 462.10% 462.10% 462.10% 462.10% 461.56%
h12 21.55% 21.55% 21.55% 21.55% 21.59%
h21 -100% -100% -100% -100% -100%
l12 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
l21 -100% -100% -100% -100% -100%
Table B.5: Subsidy to US workers
subsidy to US workers 0.2 0.3 0.4
θH1 -41.3511% -40.1470% -42.3996%
θL1 -84.3294% -82.7549% -86.4749%
θH2 -71.1264% -70.9811% -64.9997%
θL2 25.4813% -3.2807% -10.9265%
wH11 1.2482% 1.2034% 1.2950%
wL11 -3.0482% -2.8672% -3.3230%
wH22 -7.5549% -6.2860% -4.9260%
wL22 -0.1843% -0.0927% -0.6989%
uH11 43.9958% 41.6115% 48.0424%
uL11 -26.3794% -26.3178% -27.8059%
uH22 -52.46% -45.49% -38.17%
uL22 18.69% 2.14% 27.25%
h12 959.52% 981.85% 708.43%
h21 27% 25% 23%
l12 5% 5% 5%
l21 -5% 0% -3%
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